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Executive Summary 
 
This document examines EU development cooperation with Latin America, considering, first, 
the changes in the international development agenda that are relevant to the region, including 
the debate about the relevance and methods of cooperation with middle-income countries 
(MICs), the implementation of the Paris Declaration about the effectiveness of aid and South-
South development cooperation in Latin America, in the context of the redefinition of 
regionalism and integration in this region. Second, it analyses EU cooperation with Latin 
America, considering especially its regional dimension, the strategies adopted, and the 
challenge represented by adapting cooperation to the creation of a ‘network’ of association 
agreements on which it is intended to base bi-regional relations. Special attention is paid to 
cooperation in science and technology, an increasingly important area of cooperation with the 
region, particularly with upper MICs. 
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EUROPEAN UNION DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
WITH LATIN AMERICA: ASSESSMENT AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 
1. THE NEW CONTEXT FOR EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA  
 
1.1. The ‘global partnership for development’: an international consensus for 
development cooperation policies 
 
Development cooperation and aid policies are going through an intense process of change, with regard 
to both ideas and practices. A broad international consensus has been achieved on the objectives of 
poverty reduction and social development, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which form a 
‘social agenda for globalisation’. The MDGs aim to establish a ‘global partnership for development’, 
based on agreement about the principles and means necessary to achieve these goals, particularly aid, 
trade liberalisation, debt reduction and access to technology. This is primarily the responsibility of 
industrialised countries, but developing countries are responsible for improving their policies and 
institutions, whose main focus has to be to achieve the MDGs. 
 
The adoption of the Millennium Declaration by the United Nations General Assembly in 2000 was the 
culmination of a process of great importance paving the way for an international development 
consensus.1 The development of this consensus was conditioned by the painful experience of 
adjustment in the 1980s and the World Bank's renewed emphasis on the fight against poverty in 1995, 
when James Wolfensohn became president of the institution (Sanahuja 2001). In 1998, after the Asian 
crisis, the World Bank promoted a ‘post-Washington consensus’, focusing on this goal (Stiglitz 1998). 
The thematic summit meetings organised by the United Nations in the 1990s also played a key role by 
reviving the international cooperation agenda in the more favourable post-Cold War context. These 
meetings produced a series of development goals, called 2015 Goals. Civil society organisations also 
played a certain role in this process. In 2000, with the adoption of these goals by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), they 
became ‘ multilateral’ (United Nations, 2000). In that year, the Millennium Declaration adopted by the 
General Assembly, with the support of 189 states and 147 heads of state and government, gave 
unprecedented political backing to the MDGs, particularly the fight against poverty. 
 
An important development was the inclusion of Goal 8 in the MDGs, which set out the means 
necessary to achieve the goals of social development, health, improvements in the environment and 
poverty reduction listed in the other seven goals. MDG 8 proposed a ‘global partnership for 
development’ that included a broad commitment by the industrialised countries to an open trading 
system, debt relief, access to technology and called on them to provide more generous development 
assistance. In exchange, developing countries undertook to implement ‘good governance’ and adopt 
adequate poverty reduction policies. MDG 8 set the following indicators of progress on aid: total 
Official Development Assistance (ODA); the level of aid for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs); 
the proportion of aid for basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe 
water and sanitation); the proportion of aid not tied to the purchase of donor goods and services; and 
the level of aid for countries with special needs. 
 
The European Union has been an important driving force behind the development of this consensus 
and the establishment of global development goals and has incorporated them into its own 
development policy. In some respects, it has tried to go further than what has been agreed at the 
summit meetings. In particular, with regard to increasing aid, the EU has maintained its international 
commitment to spend 0.7% of Gross National Income of the most advanced countries, despite the 
                                                 
1 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/2, adopted on 8 September 2000,  
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resistance of other countries, such as the United States, and has unilaterally adopted a timetable to 
achieve this figure no later than 2015.2  
 
 
1.2. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and aid flows: the situation in the 
middle-income countries 
 
The MDGs and previous commitments, particularly the Monterrey Consensus, resulting from the 
United Nations Summit on Financing for Development, in 2002, led donors to refocus cooperation on 
poorer social sectors and the poorest countries, which, according to World Bank and United Nations 
classifications, includes the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Low Income Countries (LICs). 
This has involved focusing on sub-Saharan Africa and eastern and southern Asia, which in turn has 
meant reducing or even stopping aid to middle-income countries (MICs) and especially to upper 
MICs. This trend is more visible in Latin America and the Caribbean, where all countries, except 
Haiti, are classified in this income band. This is the picture that emerges from data published by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Its analysis shows the following trends:3 
 
- General changes: redirecting aid towards MICs and the poorest countries (LDCs and LICs): at 
first sight, DAC figures show that the proportion of ODA going to MICs has increased from an 
average of 35% during the period 1994-2000 to 40% in 2005. However, this figure includes 
contributions to Iraq, a MIC that received 20% of world ODA in that year because of the 
extraordinary contributions made by the United States and the cancellation of debt agreed by the 
Club of Paris, which is counted as ODA.4 If Iraq is excluded, due to its exceptional situation, 
ODA to MICs fell to 28% of the total, in line with a visible downward trend. In the period 
1994-2005, ODA to MICs fell by 6%, while ODA to LDCs and LICs increased by 4.5% and 
1.7% respectively.  
 
-  The ‘MIC effect’: stagnation and relative decline of ODA to Latin America. In the period 1994-
2005, ODA to Latin America followed a similar course to that of global ODA: it fell until 2000, 
recovered in 2001 and remained at levels similar to the beginning of the 1990s during the period 
2001-2005 (between USD 4 000 and 5 000 million). Since 2001, global ODA has almost 
doubled, so the percentage of ODA received by Latin America fell from 9% in 2001 to 5% in 
2005.  
 
- The ‘MDGs effect’: Increasingly progressive distribution of ODA in Latin America, although 
with ‘donor darlings’ and ‘donor orphans’. A look at the allocation list for net ODA to 
countries in the period 1995-2005 shows an appreciable fall for upper MICs (a fall of over 60% 
for Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay, and approximately 30% for Argentina, Chile and 
Panama). Lower MICs show an uneven pattern, with aid to some countries falling (Brazil, 
Ecuador, El Salvador and Paraguay) and increasing to others (Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba and 
Honduras). Given that the increase or decrease in aid is not related to income levels in this 
group, we can say that the changes are the result of donor preferences towards some countries to 
the detriment of others and of a lack of coordination between donors. There are donor orphans 
                                                 
2 Council Conclusions of May 2005, prior to the Millennium+5 Summit. Member States that have not yet 
achieved an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.51% undertake to attain that level by 2010, while those that are already above 
that level undertake to continue their efforts. Member States that joined the EU after 2002, and have not yet 
achieved an ODA/GNI of 0.17% in 2005, will endeavour to increase their ODA to attain that level by 2010, 
while those that are already above that level undertake to continue their efforts. Member States undertake to 
achieve the target of 0.7% by 2015, while those that have achieved that target commit themselves to remaining 
above that target, and the new Member States commit themselves to increase their ODA/GNI to 0.33% by 2015. 
3 This analysis is based on the I Informe de la Cooperación en Iberoamérica, Secretaría General Iberoamericana 
(SEGIB), Xalma, 2007; and the International Development Association Report, 2007.  
4 In 2000, Iraq and Afghanistan accounted for less than 1% of world ODA. This increased to 25% by 2005. See 
Sanahuja, 2004 and the report by various authors: The Reality of AID 2005.  
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and donor darlings in Latin America and the Caribbean, although to a lesser degree than in 
other regions. Finally, aid to also increased to Nicaragua, the only LIC country in the region. In 
2005, 70% of ODA went to only five countries (Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras, Colombia and 
Peru); a further 20% went to Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico; and the 
other 10% was shared between the remaining nine countries. As a whole, the effect of the 
MDGs in Latin America has been to promote more progressive distribution of aid and therefore 
less aid to upper MICs.  
 
- The ‘anti-terrorism effect’: the case of Colombia. This country received the biggest increase in 
ODA during the period (more than 300%) because of the increasing importance of security and 
anti-terrorism as reasons for granting aid and the increase of aid to the security sector itself. 
There is, therefore, a major increase in aid for the ‘global war on terror’ and to countries like 
Iraq and Afghanistan and, in Latin America, to Colombia (Sanahuja 2005).  
 
- The privatisation of financing for development and the MICs: private flows are increasingly 
important for financing developing countries, relegating official flows into second place. In 
2006, private flows reached the record figure of USD 647 000 million, approximately half of 
which was direct foreign investment, a third was bank loans and the rest was portfolio 
investment. Financial transfers by emigrants have tripled since 2000, increasing from about 
USD 70 000 million to a historic maximum of USD 206 000 million in 2006. Although ODA 
has been at record levels since 2005, at above USD 100 000 million, it represents an 
increasingly less important part of net flows to the poorest countries. Moreover, since 2002, 
many developing countries have improved their balance of payments and strengthened their 
reserves thanks to an ‘export bonanza’ and have stopped requesting loans from bilateral donors 
and multilateral institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc.) with whom they have a deficit. However, 
the situation of the 51 poorest countries is different, as they only receive 8% of total flows and 
therefore continue to be dependent on official aid. Private flows are approximately ten times 
greater than official aid to Latin America (see annex). In the three-year period 2004-2006, the 
region received USD 23 000 million (approximately USD 7 000 million per year on average) in 
ODA, while private flows totalled USD 190 000 million. In those three years, the region’s 
deficit with official creditors was USD 66 000 million, which means that ODA was equivalent 
to only a third of the payments that the region made to creditors of the Club of Paris and to 
multilateral financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, to which countries like 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela have made advance repayments of their debts. Financial 
transfers from migrants increased from approximately USD 20 000 to USD 52 000 million per 
year between 2000 and 2006, almost eight times more than total official aid. All this has 
implications for the MICs, because ODA is losing its relative importance as a financing 
mechanism, but gaining importance as an instrument for supporting changes in policies to 
reduce the vulnerability of countries to the greater volatility and risk of private flows. 
 
 
1.3. Latin America and the Caribbean and the development cooperation agenda with 
middle-income countries 
 
The reduction in aid to MICs has often been justified by claiming that the real problem in many of 
these countries is inequality and not poverty. It is argued that it is not justifiable to hand over external 
resources when the internal actors themselves do not want to adopt the policies, especially 
redistributive policies, needed to solve the problem. In response to this argument, and to justify the 
relevance of development aid to MICs, some have pointed to the existence of ‘pockets of poverty’. 
This reminds us that the classification of countries by their level of income is based on national 
averages that hide inequality and that MICs account for 41% of the world's population living below 
the poverty line (less than two dollars a day) or in extreme poverty (less than one dollar a day). In fact, 
the social situation of a significant number of lower MICs in Central America and the Andean area is 
not that different from the situation in low income countries. 
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The first of these arguments would be appropriate if reducing aid were to encourage internal changes 
in developing countries, including the adoption of policies more favourable to the poor. This is 
unlikely. However, there are other important reasons to maintain aid to MICs and these are 
particularly applicable to the situation in Latin America. As Alonso has indicated (2007a and b), if the 
aim is to eradicate poverty, progress must be made in the MICs, given the numbers of poor people in 
these countries. Second, the aid system would be establishing a perverse system of incentives and 
raising a moral issue if progress in development were to be penalised by a reduction in aid. Third, it is 
important to avoid backward steps in countries where progress has not been consolidated, and in 
countries at a high risk because of their external vulnerability to financial or other crises. Fourth, these 
countries also often act as regional ‘anchors’ in terms of economic development and regional stability 
(for example, Mexico with regard to Central America and Brazil with regard to the Andean countries 
and South America). Fifth, the fight to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development partly 
depends on the adequate provision and maintenance of global and regional public goods – peace and 
security, financial stability, global health and the fight against pandemics and preservation of the 
environment – and these cannot be ensured without the support of the MICs. Finally, in addition to 
being recipients of aid, these countries can also be donors through innovative horizontal or triangular 
South-South cooperation mechanisms, so aid to MICs may mobilise more resources and encourage the 
developing countries themselves and their regional organisations to take more responsibility for 
attaining the MDGs.  
 
Attainment of the MDGs, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, requires consideration of 
the specific features and characteristics of the region’s MICs, in particular high inequality and 
institutional weaknesses. To refer to Alonso again (2007b: 3), many MICs have had periods of strong 
growth but have not been able to sustain it (in a cyclical process of boom and bust) due to a series of 
obstacles or ‘traps to progress’ (Alonso 2006) that, leaving the differences between countries aside, 
seem to stem from three major problems: a) institutional weakness and the lack of social cohesion; b) 
the vulnerability of their international position, particularly with regard to finance and trade; and c) 
difficulties in improving technology and production. In other words, and over and above the ‘pockets 
of poverty’ argument, if we want to argue for cooperation with the MICs in the context of the 
‘diversion of aid’ to the poorest countries, such cooperation must help resolve these three major 
problems.  
 
- Institutional strengthening and social cohesion: fragile institutions mean weak government 
capacity to provide public goods, manage conflicts over distribution, deal with external shocks, 
regulate markets, manage public services, ensure social cohesion and tackle the high level of 
inequality that characterises some MICs, especially in Latin America. All these factors 
contribute to undermining the legitimacy of institutions. Therefore, priorities for an effective 
cooperation policy with MICs include improvements in government policies through 
institutional reform; the exchange of experiences in order to reduce the cost of innovation (such 
as the social programme); the strengthening of specific health and education programmes; and 
support for social actors favourable to change. One key aspect that illustrates both institutional 
weakness and the lack of cohesion is the state's fiscal weakness, which is why financial and 
technical support for a ‘ fiscal package’ and tax reform is crucial. 
 
- Financial stability and policies to deal with economic cycles: As the crises of recent years have 
shown, the vulnerability of MICs to financial shocks stems from operating in highly volatile 
financial markets when all of the following factors are present: a high level of indebtedness, 
tight national capital markets, the issuing of short-term bonds to raise finance, liabilities in 
foreign currencies and hurried liberalisation of the capital account. This requires greater 
regulation of the international financial markets through a ‘new international financial 
architecture’ that can resolve the ‘systemic’ problems of these markets; stronger national 
financial systems and increased state capacity to regulate their operation; solutions to the 
problem of sovereign debt by adequate international regulation, which is still lacking (IMF 
proposals for this after the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002 became bogged down) and freedom 
DV\730571EN 9 
External Translation 
for MICs to apply policies designed to deal with crises caused by economic cycles and, in this 
way, preserve the progress made in reducing poverty. 
 
- Policies to improve positions in international trade through greater competitiveness and secure, 
stable access to external markets. Policies to promote competitiveness include improvements in 
infrastructure, especially policies for absorbing knowledge and technology that can increase 
production capacity. The aim is to boost production and exports by generating dynamic 
competitive advantages and moving towards more productive and dynamic activities. This will 
break the ‘vicious circle’ that holds back Latin American countries, which tend to concentrate 
on intensive production using natural resources and low quality jobs and discourage national 
policies to improve education and acquire research, development and innovation (RDI) 
capacities. The regulation of intellectual property by the WTO and regional trade agreements 
also have a negative effect, by reducing the scope for national policies in this field. What 
cooperation policies might play a key role here? First, a well-planned opening up of trade is 
required, through agreements (both regional South-South integration or ‘South-North’ trade 
agreements) that ensure access to external markets, increase external investment and encourage 
innovation and competitiveness, but that also recognise the asymmetries and allow for the 
application of active policies to mitigate the costs of adjustment and promote a transformation 
in production capacity, especially in the case of ‘South-North’ agreements, in which 
asymmetries are much greater. Financial support by external partners, particularly the EU, for 
these active policies can play a key role if there are budgetary limitations. Support for 
improving infrastructure is also important, given that for some countries, extra transport costs 
are greater than the tariffs levied on their products. Finally, cooperation in science and 
technology programmes that help to generate endogenous capacities and the transfer of 
technology from abroad are essential steps in this field. 
 
Discussions of the ways in which the impact and effectiveness of aid to low-income countries can be 
increased have also led to important changes in aid methods and instruments. Project-based 
approaches (project-aid) are being abandoned because they often weaken public policies and 
institutions and tend to reflect donor priorities rather than those of the recipients. The trend is to prefer 
programmes (programme-aid) that form part of national poverty reduction strategies (PRS), such as 
direct budget support and sector-wide approaches (SWA) that place all external support within the 
framework of a general policy for key sectors, such as health or education (Sanahuja 2007).  
 
Because of their similarities with low income countries, this type of instrument can be appropriate for 
lower MICs in the Andean subregion and Central America, where aid is a significant proportion of 
GDP and a significant component of external financing and where national PRS are in place. 
However, in upper MICs, especially the most developed ones, the use of these instruments does not 
seem feasible because the proportion of aid to GDP is very low and inadequate to meet the wide-
ranging objectives and political agenda of a PRS or provide direct budget support. It might be more 
appropriate here to focus on specific problems and obstacles to development, such as strengthening 
institutional capacities and/or policy design; supporting social actors that promote political, 
institutional and legal changes, at both national and international levels; and identifying opportunities 
to mobilise additional resources. The multilateral banks (the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Andean Development Corporation and, in the case of the EU, the European 
Investment Bank), whose ordinary loans are not treated as ODA, will be important here. These banks 
can play an important role independently or by mobilising private resources for financing 
infrastructure, as this requires levels of investment that are not usually within the reach of bilateral 
donors or the European Commission. 
 
In recent years, within the framework of the international consensus on the MDGs, there have been 
various initiatives and multilateral initiatives to promote the development agenda of MICs and avoid 
simplistic interpretations of aid for MDGs, with the backing of the MICs themselves, some donor 
countries, such as Spain, and the multilateral development banks, given that the MICs have been the 
main drawers on their ordinary credits. Particularly noteworthy were the first Inter-Governmental 
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Conference on MICs (Madrid, 1-3 March 2007), convened by the United Nations and the Spanish 
government, and attended by representatives of 70 countries and inter-governmental bodies5 and the 
second Conference (San Salvador, 1-2 October 2007), attended by representatives of 40 governments 
and 17 international organisms. This agenda has also been promoted by the Ibero-American 
Conference and the Ibero-American Secretariat (SEGIB). The seventeenth Ibero-American Summit 
(Santiago de Chile) approved a declaration specifically on this question, calling ‘…on the 
international community to continue providing cooperation and supporting the national efforts of 
middle-income countries in the fight against poverty and inequality; to attain the Millennium 
Development Goals on time; to take into account additional criteria to per capita income when 
allocating international aid; to promote the adoption of new and innovative international cooperation 
and financing methods and instruments; and to more actively support horizontal and triangular 
cooperation formulas, including the issue on the working agendas of relevant international forums in 
order to be able to implement this initiative effectively’. 
 
The MICs agenda was included in the European Consensus on Development of 2005. According to 
this document, the priority of the EU and Member States when allocating ODA will be the low-
income countries, but ‘the EU also remains committed to supporting the pro-poor development of 
middle-income countries (MICs), especially the lower MICs, and our development assistance to all 
developing countries will be focused on poverty reduction, in its multi-dimensional aspects, in the 
context of sustainable development’ (point 24). On Community policy, it adds that ‘support to middle-
income countries also remains important to attaining the MDGs. Many lower MICs are facing the 
same kind of difficulties as LICs. A large number of the world's poor live in these countries and many 
are confronted with striking inequalities and weak governance, which threaten the sustainability of 
their own development process (…) Many MICs have an important role in political, security and trade 
issues, producing and protecting global public goods and acting as regional anchors. But they are 
also vulnerable to internal and external shocks, or are recovering, or suffering, from conflicts’ (point 
61). Finally, this agenda was included in the Declaration of Vienna, adopted at the fourth EU-Latin 
America and Caribbean Summit. In particular, the section on development and cooperation welcomed 
‘the continuing support to middle-income countries through economic and development cooperation, 
including the implementation of poverty eradication strategies, taking account of their role in 
political, security and trade issues’ (point 41).  
 
 
1.4. Latin America, ‘post-liberal regionalism’ and strengthening ‘South-South 
cooperation’ 
 
As we have indicated, South-South cooperation is of great relevance to the MICs. It generates benefits 
for both donors and recipients, including institutional and technological capacities, investment, access 
to markets and the internationalisation of the economic actors. The MICs themselves consider it may 
be a better way of meeting their needs, making greater use of local resources and generating a greater 
sense of ownership.  
 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, South-South cooperation is not a new phenomenon. It has been 
deployed bilaterally, in the framework of regional integration agreements, which, in addition to 
liberalising markets and adopting common rules, has stimulated closer cooperation among government 
actors, universities and local organisations (for example, Mercosur’s mercociudades network) and 
among border regions. Financial integration instruments deserve a special mention; these include the 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) and the Andean Development Corporation 
(CAF), which has a portfolio of loans worth more than USD 8 000 million and has the lowest risk 
classification in the region. These institutions have accepted EU donors, like Spain, as non-borrowing 
shareholders. 
 
                                                 
5 The study presented to this conference, and already quoted here, was by Alonso (2007b).  
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However, several factors have led to a significant increase in South-South cooperation in recent years. 
Some countries that have experienced higher growth have providing assistance to other countries in 
the region within the framework of a more active foreign policy, whether to increase their prestige, 
promote regional or subregional stability or comply with international commitments, for example, the 
assistance given by some countries to Haiti. However, perhaps the most relevant factor is the 
appearance of new regionalist models and strategies, which one observer has called ‘post-liberal’ 
(Motta et al. 2007), in particular, the Venezuelan Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) 
project and the attempt to reformulate South American integration within the framework of both a 
more ‘political’ Mercosur and a Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). 
 
Even though these proposals have different approaches, they are characterised by: a) the primacy of 
their political agenda, which is not unrelated to the arrival in power of left-wing governments and the 
attempts made by some countries to exercise greater leadership in the region, particularly Venezuela 
and Brazil; b) the greater role afforded to state actors, within the framework of post-Washington 
consensus developmentalist economic agendas that distance themselves from open regional strategies 
based on trade liberalisation, the private sector and market forces, that have prevailed since the 
beginning of the 1990s; c) their greater emphasis on a ‘positive’ integration agenda, centred on 
common institutions and policies and greater cooperation in fields other than trade; d) greater concern 
for social issues and the asymmetries of development, and the links between regional integration, 
poverty reduction, inequality and social justice; e) greater concern to tackle ‘bottlenecks’ and the 
shortcomings of regional infrastructure, with a view to improving links between regional markets and 
facilitating access to external markets; f) greater emphasis on energy security and the search for 
complementarity in this sector; and g) the search for greater social participation and legitimisation of 
integration processes (Sanahuja 2008).  
 
This type of cooperation has a series of frameworks and modalities. Horizontal South-South 
cooperation only involves developing countries. Triangular South-South cooperation involves the 
contribution of financial resources by a traditional donor (developed country or a multilateral agency) 
but the human resources and know-how are contributed by a developing country. One type of 
horizontal cooperation is regional in nature and is an expression of the common policies adopted as a 
result of regional integration agreements. A second type is bilateral in character and is more an 
expression of the foreign policy priorities and/or capacities of donor countries. A major focus for 
bilateral South-South cooperation is technical assistance, because of its low cost and immediate effect 
and because it provides opportunities to put the donor’s strongest capacities to use. Technical 
assistance covers various fields, such as agriculture and food security, infrastructure, the environment, 
public administration, geographical information systems, the fight against HIV-AIDS. However, 
South-South cooperation also includes direct action on basic social development, such as health and 
education, financial assistance and cooperation on energy issues. Important areas for regional 
cooperation are energy, physical infrastructure and reduction of asymmetries. This has been assisted 
by the creation of mechanisms such as the Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM), which 
began to operate in 2008, and the mechanism proposed for implementation within the framework of 
the Central American customs union in December 2007. As we will see, Venezuela is a special case, 
in which cooperation includes both typologies and forms part of a Latin American initiative to 
promote ‘alternative integration’. Although the most active donors are the upper MICs (Argentina, 
Chile, Mexico and Venezuela), they also include lower MICs such as Brazil, Colombia and Cuba 
(Xalma 2007: 57-88). 
 
There is no detailed information available about the decision-making bodies or the resources invested 
in South-South cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean, because there is no regional 
organisation that carries out this work. Moreover, these countries are not members of the OECD’s 
Development Aid Committee (DAC), which records the contributions made by the more advanced 
countries. Moreover, some South-South forms of cooperation do not fit into DAC categories, either 
because they are not grants of aid or because they are the work of semi-state actors. It is therefore 
difficult to estimate their magnitude. In any case, it is necessary to avoid trying to use DAC categories 
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to understand the innovative and specific nature of South-South cooperation in the region. On this 
basis, we can identify the following models and strategies:  
 
- Priority for technical assistance and higher education: cooperation between Argentina and 
Chile: Both countries have built a cooperation model based on technical assistance and training, 
with a high degree of sectoral and geographical diversification. Technical standards are close to 
those of donors, especially in the case of Chile, which has created an autonomous agency, the 
Chilean International Cooperation agency (AGCI), to manage the aid that Chile both receives 
and provides. The most important sectors for Argentina have been agriculture, education and 
production sectors and, for Chile, governance and institutional capacity-building, promotion of 
exports, aquaculture and forest resources. Both countries, particularly Chile, have a higher 
education scholarship programme. Finally, we should mention the efforts made by both 
countries in Haiti. Chile has also developed triangular cooperation activities. 
 
- Energy and technical assistance: the case of Mexico. Pioneers in South-South cooperation, 
Mexico and Venezuela concluded the San José Agreement in 1980. Mexico supplies oil on 
preferential terms to ten Central American and Caribbean countries to facilitate economic 
stability. Mexico is also very active in providing technical assistance and triangular cooperation 
in such sectors as industrial development and environmental protection. 
 
- Global profile and the role of semi-public actors: the case of Brazil. Brazil's South-South 
cooperation forms part of a foreign policy that has global and not only regional dimensions. It 
has focused on Africa and Asia, paying special attention to Portuguese-speaking countries and 
also emerging powers with common economic and trade interests, through the G20 and the 
India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) platform. It has also, of course, focused on Latin America, 
and more specifically South America and the UNASUR project. Brazil's cooperation 
programme has several major focuses, including energy, infrastructure, health (especially the 
fight against HIV-AIDS) and debt cancellation. Cooperation forms part of Brazil’s role in the 
United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (Ayllón, Nogueira and Puerto 
2007). Some cooperation, especially technical assistance, is provided by the Agencia Brasileña 
de Cooperación (Brazilian Cooperation Agency) but a characteristic feature of the South-South 
cooperation undertaken by Brazil is the importance of semi-public actors and autonomous state 
agencies, including companies with a majority government holding, such as Petrobras and 
public banks, such as the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Económico y Social – BNDES 
(National Economic and Social Development Bank). These organisations operate on a 
commercial or mutual interest basis: Petrobras operates independently or through joint 
companies in other countries; BNDES has a credit line of USD 2 600 million with which to 
finance Brazilian exports and public works carried out by Brazilian companies, including major 
construction and engineering companies like Odebrecht and Alston (Hirst 2006: 136; Sennes 
and Tomazini: 2006). These actors also include pharmaceutical companies and public 
foundations, such as the Osvaldo Cruz Foundation and the Fiocruz and Farmanginhas 
laboratories, through which Brazil conducts a South-South Links programme providing 
technical assistance and generic antiretrovirals. These drugs are produced by Brazil under WTO 
rules that allow the suspension of patents in the event of health emergencies. Fourteen 
developing countries in Portuguese-speaking Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
including Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic 
have been beneficiaries. 
 
- The ‘Bolivarian’ project: the cases of Petrocaribe and ALBA. Venezuela has played a leading 
role in a South-South cooperation programme that forms part of a high-profile foreign policy 
initiative known as the ‘Bolivarian project’. This initiative bears the strong imprint of the 
president and has been developed in the favourable context of high oil prices. The project aims 
to promote ‘new international geopolitics’ and a ‘multipolar world’ to counter United States 
hegemony. In order to achieve this, it aims to construct a ‘South American power bloc’ and 
establish South-South relations with Africa and Asia. The aim is to make Venezuela ‘a world 
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energy power’ and promote an ‘alternative integration’ different to the ‘neoliberal’ concept of 
integration represented by both the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Andean 
Community of Nations (ACN) and Mercosur. This alternative integration will promote ‘fair 
trade’ and eliminate asymmetries through cooperation, complementarity, solidarity, reciprocity 
and mutual respect for the sovereignty of each country. The practical result of all this is the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), which is a response to the FTAA and an 
expression of Venezuelan’s leadership ambitions. It has occasionally vied with Brazil for this 
role in South America (Burges 2007).  
 
ALBA is the result of ‘summit diplomacy’ with a high political and media profile. Despite its 
promotion of the idea of integration, it represents, above all, a South-South framework for cooperation 
based on ideological affinity rather than economic complementarity and it would be unimaginable 
without Venezuelan oil. We can identify six areas of cooperation: a) energy, especially based on 
Petrocaribe and other bilateral agreements; b) social, in which Cuba plays a key role through the work 
of its doctors in Venezuela on the Barrio Adentro Mission and similar programmes in Bolivia; Cuba’s 
Operation Miracle, which has carried out more than 400 000 ophthalmologic operations on patients in 
various countries, including members of ALBA and others; and the creation of the Latin American 
School of Medicine (ELAM) in Cuba. There are also literacy, cultural and sporting cooperation 
initiatives; c) economic, which promotes economic complementarity through compensatory trade and 
trade in kind, within the framework of the Peoples Trade Treaty (TCP) of 2006, and the creation of 
mixed and major (grannacionales) companies; d) infrastructure, particularly between Cuba and 
Venezuela in the energy sector, with the repair of the Cienfuegos refinery, which has become one of 
Petrocaribe’s nerve centres; e) communications, through TeleSur and the Cuba-Venezuela submarine 
cable, which aims to improve Cuban access to global communications networks; and f) financial, with 
the ALBA Fund and ALBA Bank. A key element of this cooperation has been preferential access to 
Venezuelan oil, through the bilateral Cuba-Venezuela agreement, Petrocaribe, created in June 2005,6 
and ALBA’s Energy Treaty, adopted at the fifth ALBA Summit (29 April 2007, Barquisimeto, 
Venezuela). In addition to these agreements, there are bilateral initiatives with Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay and there are plans for a ‘Petroamérica’ company. It is important to 
note that most of the 14 Caribbean countries in Petrocaribe are not members of ALBA, because of its 
strong ideological basis and anti-United States position, to which few Caribbean governments are 
willing to commit themselves. Beneficiaries of Petrocaribe do not therefore necessarily join ALBA 
(Serbín 2006) or, in the case of Nicaragua, abandon the Central America-United States Free Trade 
Treaty (CAFTA-DR). 
 
Recognizing the importance of South-South cooperation, some DAC donors (especially Germany, 
Japan, Belgium and the United Kingdom) and multilateral agencies (FAO, UNFPA, IICA) have 
promoted triangular arrangements. Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have been actively 
involved in implementation and the main recipients have been the poorest Central American and 
Andean countries, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic (Xalma 2007). 
 
As we have shown, the development of South-South cooperation in Latin America is a response to 
several factors. It is a ‘post-liberal’ reinterpretation of regionalism and regional integration with a 
marked ideological content, which explains why there is no consensus in the region about its 
programme and methods, and why there have been visible disagreements in some countries between 
DAC donor agencies and new donors like Venezuela.7 However, it should also be seen as the 
                                                 
6 Petrocaribe extended the facilities provided by Venezuela in 1974 and gave continuity to the Caracas Energy 
Agreement, 2000. Petrocaribe supplies oil on preferential financial terms to 13 Caribbean countries, including 
Cuba, in addition to PDVSA cooperation on storage, refining and transport with public sector companies. See 
Mayobre 2006. With the reopening (2007) and future extension of the Cienfuegos refinery, Cuba will become 
one of Petrocaribe’s refining and distribution centres. Nicaragua and Haiti joined the agreement at the third 
Summit in August 2007, taking the number of members to 16. Honduras and Guatemala have also shown an 
interest in joining.  
7 This is particularly the case in Nicaragua, where Venezuelan cooperation is not party to the alignment and 
harmonisation efforts set in motion by the Paris Declaration on the effectiveness of aid. See Schulz 2007.  
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expression of the more active role being played by some countries, their leadership aspirations and 
more assertive foreign policy, as well as their capacity to contribute to attaining the MDGs as donors 
and not only as recipients. 
 
 
1.5. Towards a new aid architecture? The Paris Declaration of 2005 
 
Some of the problems that afflict the development cooperation system are due to inefficient 
institutions rather than a lack of resources. The system reflects an increasingly integrated world, but 
one in which political authority is fragmented between more than 190 sovereign states. International 
organisations do not always have the skills or resources to guarantee the peace, security and 
governance of the international system, ensure the provision of global public goods or eradicate 
increasing inequalities. This may be a ‘Westphalian’ world, but the system of aid is highly 
decentralised, without authoritative rules on the quantity of aid, the criteria that govern its distribution 
or the technical and procedural aspects, despite the agreements adopted within the DAC or on the 
MDGs, which are hardly binding. Although the moral and political obligation to provide aid is 
recognised, it continues to be voluntary and discretionary in legal terms. The necessary consequence is 
that recipients have no title or right to aid. This fundamental asymmetry has other well-known 
consequences: the volatility of aid; recurring problems of coordination between donors; overlapping 
and inefficient aid; unequal and inequitable distribution (donor darlings and donor orphans); high 
transaction costs; tied aid, subject to political and trade conditions or designed to increase the prestige 
of donors; and free-rider behaviour by some when attempts are being made to share the burden of 
collective international action to promote development. 
 
These problems have been aggravated by two tendencies that afflict the aid system’s institutional 
architecture: the proliferation of donors and the fragmentation of aid. By the term ‘proliferation’, we 
mean the increasing number of donors with which recipient countries have to deal. By 
‘fragmentation’, we mean the increasing number of activities, the reduction in the size of funds and 
the tendency for donors to allocate funds to activities that are not among the recipient’s development 
priorities (International Development Association 2007; Sanahuja 2007). 
 
The number of donors has increased over time and the regular appearance of ‘new’ donors indicates 
that this tendency will continue. There were barely half a dozen donor countries in the 1950s, but there 
are now more than 50, to which we can add approximately 230 international organisations and an 
increasing number of local and regional governments and international NGOs. There are already about 
20 ‘global funds’. If we only take official donors into account, there are more donors than recipient 
countries. It is estimated that aid from non-DAC donor countries tripled between 2001 and 2005, 
reaching about USD 5 000 million in that year. This group includes traditional donors, such as the 
Arab oil exporting countries and ‘emerging donors’ such as the new EU Member States, OECD 
members that are not members of the DAC, such as Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, the unusual case of 
Taiwan and emerging countries such as Russia, India, China, South Africa, Brazil and Venezuela, 
which have promoted an increase in South-South cooperation. 
 
In addition, since the end of the 1990s, there has been a very rapid increase in the number of ‘global 
funds’ and ‘innovative mechanisms’ to mobilise more funds, which seek to ensure the allocation of 
more resources and the attainment of rapid results for particular MDGs, such as basic education and 
the fight against HIV-AIDS, and to finance public goods. These funds are succeeding in their attempts 
to attract resources, but it is not clear whether they are additional aid or whether they are being 
diverted from traditional mechanisms. They make it more difficult for donors to coordinate activities 
and to link their initiatives with each country's development and PRS (Lele et al. 2006). The impetus 
to create these funds came from the Monterey Conference, from practical proposals made by 
individual countries and from the philanthropic initiatives of the private sector or coalitions such as the 
Alliance against Hunger and Poverty formed by Brazil, Chile, Spain and France, with the support of 
the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. Some funds were created in the 
1990s, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), but some of the most important were created 
DV\730571EN 15 
External Translation 
after 2000: the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis; the Rapid Response Initiative-
Education for All; or the tax on airline tickets. It is currently estimated that these funds channel about 
3% of ODA, but this figure is increasing. 
 
There is also a growing number of fiduciary ‘carbon funds’, set up by multilateral banks, the UNDP, 
private actors, bilateral donors and mechanisms provided for under the Kyoto Protocol. Their number 
and resources are increasing rapidly and might grow even further if a global market in greenhouse gas 
emissions is established. In 2006, the World Bank was already managing nine funds worth more than 
USD 1 900 million, along with 13 governments and 62 companies. Although these funds are not 
counted as ODA and there is a mutual interest (donors obtain emission rights in exchange), these 
resources contribute to the sustainable development MDGs and help finance the development of 
recipient countries. 
 
As we have already indicated, in a highly decentralised aid system that lacks binding rules with which 
to define common agendas, each actor has their own mandate, interests, objectives, rules and 
management and monitoring procedures, the complexity of which often reflects the level of distrust 
aroused by the institutions and management systems of recipient countries. As a result, aid transaction 
costs are high and subject to new conditions regarding the definition of policies, particularly if the 
recipient country is one of the poorest and institutionally weakest (Easterly 2002, Acharya et al. 
2006).  
 
In the Monterey Consensus of 2002, donors openly recognised the need to improve effectiveness of 
aid and change the way in which it is distributed. They therefore decided (point 43 of the document) to 
harmonise their operational procedures in order to reduce transaction costs; strengthen the absorption 
capacity and financial management of recipient countries; make resource streams more predictable; 
use more appropriate instruments, in particular, budget support; and provide aid for development and 
PRS decided on by developing countries and for which the latter were also responsible. Although set 
out in just a few lines, this was a very demanding programme. It started a process promoted by the 
DAC, the World Bank, the EU and other actors, within the framework of the High-Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness (HLF), composed of bilateral and multilateral donors and a number of recipient 
countries. This forum has adopted important documents: the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation 
(February 2003) and the Paris Declaration on the Effectiveness of Aid (March 2005). The latter, in 
particular, defined a new paradigm in the relationship between donors and recipients, calling the latter 
‘partner countries’, in a spirit of co-responsibility. The declaration, signed by more than one hundred 
donors and developing countries, intended to consign relationships based on conditionality to the past 
and to tackle the problems resulting from the proliferation of donors and the fragmentation of aid, on 
the basis of the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, mutual accountability and 
management by results (see annex). These principles are doubly binding: first, they involve greater 
donor commitment to strengthening recipient countries’ weak or inadequate institutions and, second, 
although the intention was to end conditionality, they constitute a new more demanding framework of 
conditions. 
 
In order to measure progress in the implementation of the Paris Declaration principles, 12 goals were 
adopted, with their accompanying indicators of progress, for the period 2005-2010. These are very 
precise indicators. To mention a few, and this is not exhaustive, in the year 2010, 85% of aid flows 
must be reported in national budgets and a minimum of 75% will be channelled into multiannual 
programmes so that aid is more predictable. Also in 2010, 75% of ‘partner countries’ must have 
national development strategies with detailed financial frameworks. Donors will use public financial 
management (PFM) and procurement systems in partner countries (between 90% and 100% of donors 
using such systems and a one-third to two-thirds reduction in the percentage of ODA not using partner 
countries’ systems); a two-thirds reduction in the use of parallel implementation structures; ‘continued 
progress’ in the reduction of tied aid; 66% of ODA channelled through programme-based approaches 
(budget support and sector-wide approaches); and at least 40% of field missions conducted jointly.  
 
Both declarations have caused donors to begin to adapt their policies, particularly with regard to the 
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harmonisation objectives of the Rome Declaration of 2003 (Development Aid Committee 2005). This 
process is still just beginning in the case of the Paris Declaration. However, there is considerable 
expectation of change and a certain degree of concern among both donor agencies and ‘partner 
country’ governments. In 2006, a baseline survey was carried out into implementation of the 
Declaration in 34 countries that offered to participate and among the majority of donor agencies, 
responsible for 37% of world aid in 2005. The conclusions clearly showed that, in half of the 
developing countries that signed the Declaration, both donors and partners were a long way from 
complying with the commitments they had made (CAD: 2007a, p. 9, 2007b, pp. 56-66). One 
outstanding initiative is the ‘Pilot Exercise’ started in 22 selected countries in December 2006. 
Another meeting of the High Level Forum (HLF) has been convened in Accra, Ghana, in 2008 to take 
the process forward. 
 
The EU, which accounts for more than half of world ODA, has specifically committed itself to the 
principles of alignment, ownership, harmonisation, mutual responsibility and management by results 
and to the Paris Declaration.8 In addition, through the European Development Consensus, the EU has 
undertaken to play a leadership role in this process with commitments additional to those adopted in 
the DAC, namely that all institutional capacity-building programmes will be implemented through 
coordinated programmes; that 50% of bilateral cooperation will be conducted using recipient 
countries’ systems unless new project administration units are created; and that the number of 
uncoordinated missions will be reduced by 50%. 
 
All this shows that there is a willingness to tackle the problems that afflict aid and improve its 
effectiveness, in order to ensure the achievement of development objectives that would not be 
achieved in many countries without changes in current tendencies. The efforts to promote dialogue 
and build a consensus between donors and recipients deserves to be recognised and valued. The 
agreements on harmonisation are very timely and will reduce the bureaucratic burden imposed on 
recipients. The emphasis on the use of programme-based approaches (budget support and sector-wide 
approaches) in support of national development and PRS and the use of developing country financial 
management systems may help to correct the worst effects of an excessively fragmented and dispersed 
pattern of aid, in particular, the weakening of developing country public institutions and policies. 
 
The Paris Declaration also poses significant risks to aid and to the objectives it is intended to achieve 
within the framework of the MDGs. First, it could reduce the space for civil society to operate, despite 
the key role it plays in development. After decades in which the state has been weakened, it seems 
healthy that development cooperation should once again emphasise the capacities of the state and 
public policies. However, the agenda established by the Paris Declaration places donors in a 
centralised and exclusive relationship with states. The Declaration includes and encourages 
participation by social organisations in the design of national development programmes. Nevertheless, 
given the resistance many developing country governments display towards such participation, it 
seems unlikely it will happen. A significant proportion of aid, in particular EU aid, is currently 
channelled through NGOs. Part of the problem is to preserve their autonomy and independence, which 
is necessary if participatory development and democratic governance is to be promoted. There is a risk 
that the Paris Declaration will be used to argue for the control of NGOs and their subordination to 
governments. The other aspect of the problem is the need to address the fragmentation of aid caused 
by NGO development cooperation, which could blur national development strategies. In brief, how 
can we preserve participation, ensure coordination and avoid the subordination of civil society? 
 
A second problematic aspect is the technocratic vision of the state that underlies the Paris Declaration. 
This seems to be based on the assumption that the absence of effective poverty reduction policies, the 
persistence of policies that promote exclusion, institutional, physical, administrative and management 
weaknesses, lack of transparency, responsibility and accountability, and the existence of corruption are 
simply dysfunctions that can be resolved by technical assistance for institutional capacity-building. 
                                                 
8 Council Conclusions of November 2004 on the EU contribution to coordination, harmonisation and alignment, 
and Council Conclusions of 11 April 2006 on the Paris Declaration. 
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However, such problems are often manifestations of the interests of particular sectors or groups and 
there is an ‘economic policy of bad government’ that reflects the state’s ‘capture’ by private interests 
that extract incomes and influence by maintaining the public administration in this situation. 
‘Alignment’ of donors with such policies will be counter-productive. 
 
On the other hand, the Declaration sought to jettison conditionality and replace it with development 
‘partnerships’ based on mutual responsibility and accountability. It is a positive step that donors 
recognise they are responsible to their ‘partners’ and vice-versa, although conditionality is a 
phenomenon that cannot be eliminated by a mere act of will, as though the essentially asymmetric 
relationship between donors and recipients is an abstraction. In the words of Alison van Rooy (2006), 
senior analyst at the Canadian Development Corporation, the donors’ message will be: ‘we will do 
what you want, as long you want what we want’. 
 
Finally, the Paris Declaration deals with specific criticisms about the effectiveness of aid: leadership 
and strengthening the capacities of recipient countries, more coordinated action by donors, 
responsibility and accountability, etc. However, we must remember it focuses on ODA flows and 
leaves aside other policies that condition the effectiveness of aid, such as trade, debt, foreign 
investment, the treatment of financial transfers sent home by emigrants and access to technology, 
which are key aspects on the development agenda of the MDGs (Alonso y Sanahuja 2006). The 
Declaration does not mention the principle of coherence, and this is a significant omission. 
 
 
2. EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA 
 
2.1. The EU, the architecture of aid and reform of development policy 
 
As we have indicated, the EU has been an important actor in promoting the international development 
agenda of the MDGs and, in particular, the commitments derived from Objective 8 on increasing aid, 
improving its effectiveness and promoting coherent policies. This has required important changes in 
the development policy of the EU and Member States, and although it is paradoxical, the EU has been 
an obstacle in the way of its own agenda on policy coherence, especially with regard to trade and 
development. This document does not aim to analyse these changes in detail, but we will outline the 
changes that have contributed to developing EU cooperation instruments with Latin America. 
 
First, the EU has tried to equip itself with a common cooperation strategy, shared not only by the 
Community but also by Member States, in accordance with the principles of coordination and 
complementarity. This has led to the adoption of common positions in multilateral forums and, in 
particular, the adoption of the European Development Consensus in 2000 and again later, in 2005, 
which we mentioned above. This document, which has a bearing on both EU and bilateral policies, 
sets out a shared vision of development challenges, confirms the EU’s commitment to the MDGs and 
the Rome and Paris Declarations, establishes common objectives and defines its priorities as being the 
poorest countries and social sectors, without forgetting the MICs, in the context of a multi-
dimensional conception of poverty eradication that includes democratic governance, social justice, 
access to social services, the environment and conflict prevention. 
 
With regard to Community cooperation, it reaffirms the principles of added value, the need to 
differentiate in accordance with the characteristics of recipient countries, in particular, between upper 
MICs, lower MICs and LICs, and concentration. It establishes the following eight priority areas: a) 
trade and regional integration; b) the environment and the sustainable management of natural 
resources; c) infrastructure, communications and transport; d) water and energy; e) rural development, 
territorial planning, agriculture and food security; f) governance, democracy, human rights and support 
for economic and institutional reform; g) conflict prevention and fragile states; h) human 
development; i) social cohesion and employment. Finally, it reaffirms the principle of policy 
coherence and the need to consider Community policies in the following areas: trade, environment, 
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climate change, security, agriculture, fisheries, social dimensions of globalisation, employment and 
decent work, migration, research and innovation, information society, transport and energy.9 
 
Commission proposals for achieving the MDGs assume 50% financing through national systems and 
doubling budget aid are common objectives of the EU and of the new Member States that will join in 
2010 (European Commission: 2005b). This involves a significant change of direction for cooperation 
with Latin America, especially with LICs, which have hardly received any budget aid from the EU 
(Ayuso 2006). The EU has also undertaken to comply with DAC guidelines on untying aid to MICs 
and go beyond these recommendations, but the situation of Member States is diverse. The proportion 
of aid to MICs in Latin America that is tied continues to be too high: in 2002, only 5.5% of 
Community ODA for the ALA programme was totally untied, while the average for developing 
countries was 19%. It reached 30% for ACPs and this figure has increased in line with the 
implementation of DAC commitments, although this only affects a minority of MICs in Latin 
America. The European Consensus argues the need for untying more aid, but does not set any 
objectives. 
 
Second, since 1998, an ambitious agenda of administrative reform has been undertaken that has tried 
to overcome the problems caused by a dysfunctional organisational structure, lack of personnel and 
bureaucratic delays resulting in the accumulation of non-executed commitments to the value of more 
than EUR 20 million. Without trying to be comprehensive, we should mention the establishment of the 
Common External Relations Service in 1998, which was a precedent for the creation of the EuropeAid 
agency in 2001, a new division of labour between this agency, DG Development and DG External 
Relations and the establishment of a multiannual programming methodology that, as we will describe, 
came into full operation in 2005, and which includes important improvements in evaluation and 
quality control. Finally, there has been a ‘deconcentration’ of Commission services and personnel 
towards Delegations in developing countries and improvements in staffing. 
 
Third, one element of capital importance has been the adoption of new budgetary instruments, which 
has rationalised the wide-ranging but fragmented panoply of budget lines and rules that were in force 
until then. These new instruments are the: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument; the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance; the Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation 
(DCI); the Financial Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (which replaces 
the previous European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights); and the Instrument for Stability 
(which replaces the previous Rapid Reaction Mechanism). It is these final three that affect cooperation 
with Latin America. The most important, because of its coverage and resources, is the new Instrument 
for Development Cooperation (DCI).10  
 
The DCI replaces the previous ‘geographical instruments’, including Regulation 442/92 for 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America (ALA), which regulated community cooperation with 
the region from 1982, and more than ten thematic instruments. It has an indicative budget of 
EUR 16 897 million for the period 2007-2013, of which EUR 2 690 million (16%) are allocated to 
Latin America. Specific priorities have been established for each region and in the case of Latin 
America, they are as follows: 
 
- Promoting social cohesion: through tax and social welfare policies, investment in production 
for more and better jobs, policies to combat illegal drugs, education and health. 
                                                 
9 See Council Conclusions of May 2005 on the Commission’s Communication on the coherence of development 
policies.  
10 Regulation (EC) 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and Council on the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument, of 24 October 2006; Regulation (EC) 1085/2006 of the European Parliament and 
Council on the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA); Regulation (EC) 1905/2006 of the European 
Parliament and Council on the Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI), of 18 December 
2006; Regulation (EC) 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and Council on the Financial Instrument for the 
Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights, 20 December 2006; and Regulation (EC) 1717/2006 of the 
European Parliament and Council establishing an Instrument for Stability (IE), of 15 November 2006.  
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- Encouraging greater regional integration, including the interconnection of network 
infrastructures in coordination with activities supported by the EIB and other institutions. 
 
- Supporting the reinforcement of public institutions with good governance and the protection of 
human rights, including the rights of the child and the rights of indigenous people and 
minorities. 
 
- Supporting the creation of a common EU-Latin American higher education area. 
 
- Promoting sustainable development with particular attention to the protection of forests and 
biodiversity. 
 
The DCI also has an indicative budget of EUR 5 596 million for ‘thematic programmes’. The 
activities that form part of these programmes can take place in all developing regions, independently 
of geographical locations, so they can complement each other. The programmes approved in January 
2006 were as follows: 11  
 
- Investing in people: Social and human development programme with a budget of EUR 1 060 
million. It will focus on achieving good basic health services for all, tackling specific problems, 
such as HIV-AIDS; achieving high-quality basic education; promoting gender equality; and 
developing culture and cultural industries. 
 
- Environment and sustainable management of natural resources: with a budget of EUR 804 
million, this programme replaces and extends the previous budget line – environment and 
tropical forests. It will allow a broader approach to the question, linked in with national 
sustainability and adaptation to climate change strategies, promote the efficient use of energy 
and improve international governance of global environmental problems.  
 
- Non-state actors and local authorities in development: with a budget of EUR 1 639 million, this 
programme replaces and terminates the old cofinancing with NGOs budget line. It aims to 
contribute to achieving the MDGs through action by NGOs and local governments, and 
strengthen civil society in developing countries. NGOs and social organisations in the EU 
working on development projects in developing countries and development education in the EU 
are eligible, as are NGOs and social organisations in the developing countries themselves.  
 
- Food security: with a budget of EUR 1 709 million, this programme aims to contribute to 
achieving the MDGs on hunger and malnutrition, promote food security and make appropriate 
use of food aid in crisis situations.  
 
- Migration and asylum: with a budget of EUR 384 million, this programme will help developing 
countries ensure improved management of migratory flows, including migration to the EU and 
South-South migration, and develop co-development actions.  
 
Fourth, in May 2007, the Council adopted a new policy on the division of labour between Member 
States, which, in accordance with the Paris Declaration and the European Development Consensus, 
will try to encourage greater sectoral specialisation and will noticeably affect their profile as donors 
and the form in which the EU will ensure application of the principle of complementarity. 
  
 
                                                 
11 The documents are Investing in people COM(2006) 18 final; Non-state actors and local authorities in 
development COM(2006) 19 final; Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources including 
energy COM(2006) 20 final; Food Security COM(2006) 21 final; and Migration and asylum COM(2006) 26 
final. 
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2.2. The EU-Latin America and Caribbean Summits and the ‘strategic partnership’ 
 
After Río, the Strategic Association was able to count on such notable achievements as the new EU 
association agreements with Mexico (2000) and Chile (2002). However, since it made its appearance, 
the ‘strategic partnership’ has had to deal with an unfavourable international context, and Latin 
America seems to have slipped down the EU’s foreign relations agenda. This is due to factors such as 
the demands of EU enlargement, the displacement of European priorities towards the east and the 
Balkans, and the primacy that security and the war on terror has acquired in international relations 
since the 11 September attacks, pushing development issues into the background. Moreover, with 
regard to trade, the EU and some Latin American countries have prioritised negotiations in the WTO, 
which with the enlargement of the EU, meant tackling the difficult reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). This reform, which took place in 2002 and 2003, limited the Community's 
options in trade negotiations by maintaining a ‘productivist’ agricultural model. The difficulties 
associated with the agricultural chapter and the ‘WTO-option’ have meant that negotiations with 
Mercosur have being going on now for more than 10 years without producing an association 
agreement. By prioritising Mexico and Chile, the countries that opted for free trade with the United 
States, the EU has strengthened the perception that the new association agreements are ‘reactive’ and 
follow on from US policy. 
 
These difficulties were highlighted by the Salafranca Report, adopted by the European Parliament in 
November 2001. This report called for the reactivation of bi-regional relations and the establishment 
of a policy on Latin America and the Caribbean that is ‘global, coherent and with real content’, 
including the adoption of a Council Common Strategy and the reactivation of political dialogue on a 
‘wider agenda’ to strengthen democracy and respect for human rights and prevent and resolve 
conflicts. In the economic field, the European Parliament requested the speedy conclusion of an EU-
Mercosur Agreement and new agreements with the Andean and Central American countries, in order 
to stabilise trade preferences already granted by the Community to both groups. Finally, the report 
called for more resources for development cooperation and a more stable, multiannual financing 
framework. It proposed a ‘bi-regional Solidarity Fund’ and invited participation by the EU, Member 
States, the EIB and multilateral development banks (European Parliament 2001). 
 
The main result of the second EU-LAC Summit, held in Madrid in May 2002, was the presentation of 
a new EU-Chile association agreement, which like the agreement already signed with Mexico, 
included the creation of a free trade area. However, there was no progress on the other pending 
association agreements, which the EU has made conditional on finalisation of the WTO’s Doha 
Round, initially scheduled for December 2004. The Commission's new regional strategy for 
development cooperation for 2002-2006 was presented at the Madrid Summit (see below). New 
programmes were announced as part of this strategy, including Alliance for the Information Society 
(@LIS), the postgraduate scholarship programme (ALBAN) and the ‘Social Initiative’ that was to 
become EUROsocial, as announced at the Guadalajara Summit two years later.  
 
The agenda of the third EU-LAC Summit, held in Guadalajara, Mexico, in 2004, focused on the role 
of multilateralism and social cohesion, but the meeting was dominated by three questions of great 
importance for the ‘strategic partnership’: the international security agenda, after the invasion of Iraq; 
the stagnation of negotiations in the WTO, after the failure of the Cancun ministerial conference in 
September 2003; and the impact on EU-LA relations of the EU enlargement in May 2004. The main 
outcome of the Guadalajara Summit was the commitment made by participants to multilateralism and 
the United Nations. As for EU enlargement, the Summit showed that the new Member States had 
joined the consensus, which could be interpreted as an indicator of an early ‘Europeanisation’ of 
policies towards Latin America. 
 
With regard to trade, the Guadalajara Declaration confirmed that the EU had not abandoned the 
multilateral option, but it decided to reactivate the subregional option in the context of the stagnation 
of the Doha Round. It therefore announced the relaunch of negotiations between the EU and Mercosur 
before the end of the European Commission’s mandate in November of that year. The Guadalajara 
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Declaration also opened the possibility of beginning negotiations with the Andean and Central 
American countries, but the EU set two conditions. In addition to being conditional on finalising the 
Doha Round at the WTO, the EU said negotiations would depend on the achievement of a ‘sufficient 
level of regional economic integration’. In order to determine whether this level had been reached, a 
‘joint assessment’ on integration would be conducted. However, in the debate on social cohesion, 
Guadalajara once again showed the gap between the ambitious objectives of the bi-regional ‘strategic 
partnership’ and the paucity of available resources. The Declaration proposed a regional dialogue on 
social cohesion to exchange experiences and announced the launch of a social programme, with a 
budget of EUR 30 million, as an outcome of the ‘Social Initiative’ announced at the Madrid Summit. 
In addition, the Declaration mentioned some of problems afflicting EU cooperation with the region: 
paucity of resources; decision-making, which in the opinion of some Latin American participants was 
characterised by unilateralism on the part of the EU; restricted coverage and asymmetries of ALBAN; 
and weak cooperation in the field of science and technology, an area of cooperation that was of 
particular interest to the more advanced countries, such as Mexico and Chile. 
 
The fourth Summit meeting of Heads of States and Government of the EU and Latin America and the 
Caribbean, held in Vienna, 12 May 2006, reflected the difficult moments that both regions were 
experiencing with regard to integration. To many observers, the Summit illustrated the centrifugal 
forces that were at work in the region, with the disintegration of the Andean Community and 
Venezuela's fight for South American leadership, which had militated against rather than in favour of 
regional integration. The EU said that the summit reflected a state of introspection and absorption in 
the crisis brought about by the debate over a European Constitution and fatigue caused by the 
enlargement of the Union. However, the results of the Vienna Summit were not as negative as we 
were led to believe. Although no progress was made in negotiations on the EU-Mercosur Agreement, 
the Summit gave the ‘green light’ to the EU-Central America association agreement, subject to 
finalisation of the ‘joint assessment’ of integration agreed at the Guadalajara Summit in 2004. The 
crisis in the Andean Community prevented similar progress in that subregion, but the summit sent a 
clear political message to the leaders of the Andean countries about the need to preserve the 
Community if they wanted to reach an association agreement with the EU. This stance was very useful 
in the following months, because it helped the Andean countries, particularly Bolivia, to remain in the 
Community and ignore Venezuela's calls to abandon it. The creation of the EU-Latin America and 
Caribbean Parliamentary Assembly, the Common Space on Higher Education and the announcement 
that the Commission would open a new line of credit from the European Investment Bank to Latin 
America were also notable achievements. 
 
 
2.3. The strategic framework for EU-Latin American development cooperation 
 
Since the adoption of a strategy for relations with Latin America in 1994 (Council of the European 
Union: 1994), the EU and, in particular, the European Commission has set out its regional strategy for 
Latin America in a series of documents of varied nature, level and timeframe.12 They include 
Commission Communications to the Council and the European Parliament defining European 
Community policy towards Latin America, and are therefore part of the Community’s decision-
making process. In some cases, they cover a five-year period and establish an indicative budget, while 
others define short-term positions and proposals prior to EU-LAC Summits. In addition, there are 
Regional and Subregional Strategy Papers (RSPs) and Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), which set out 
an indicative programme for cooperation. In fact, the existence of a coherent programming framework 
is relatively recent. Although previous documents, for example, the Regional Strategy 2002-2006, 
incorporated existing objectives and programmes, it could be said that the period 2007-2013 is the first 
in which these programming frameworks have been fully set out. In 2005, a new Communication 
(European Commission: 2005) established the Commission's political priorities. It is within this 
framework that a new RSP was drafted for the period 2007-2013, along with subregional strategies for 
the Andean countries, Central America and Mercosur and the various CSPs for each country.  
                                                 
12 The documents are European Commission 1995a, 1999, 2000a, 2002, 2004 and 2005.  
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An examination of the regional strategy documents shows clear elements of continuity (see the 
summary in the annex). In the political field, the priority is democratic governance, specifically the 
consolidation of democratic institutions and the rule of law; reform of the state; respect for human 
rights; and ‘good government’. In the economic field, the themes are regional integration, institutional 
capacity-building, policy coordination, civil society participation and access to external markets. In the 
social field, the themes are the fight against poverty and social exclusion in order to promote ‘social 
cohesion’. Finally, with regard to the management of interdependencies, the EU’s priorities are to 
protect the environment, combat illegal drugs and prevent and combat natural disasters. Cross-cutting 
themes such as gender equality and the fight to stop discrimination against indigenous people, Afro-
descendants and minorities have also remained on the agenda. In addition, new priorities have 
emerged from the summit meetings and the application of the so-called Tuusula Priorities, adopted in 
2000, to promote higher education and the development of the information society. This change has 
created some problems: there is a notable imbalance between the political commitments made at 
summit meetings and the available financial resources, which have not increased. 
 
The European Commission’s procedure for defining strategy, which is unilateral, in accordance with 
Community rules, does not adequately fit the multilateral frameworks of ‘inter-regional’ agendas, for 
example at summit meetings, where there are notable asymmetries between the two sides. Neither 
does it fit the more horizontal model of relations of the new generation of association agreements 
adopted in Latin America. 
 
The most current document is A Stronger Partnership between the European Union and Latin 
America. This, the first Communication on relations with Latin America made by the Durão Barroso 
Commission, backed by the Council Conclusions of February 2006, set out priorities adapted to the 
new political cycle and to changes in Latin America. It was preceded by a wide-ranging study on the 
future of relations between the two regions (Freres and Sanahuja 2006). According to this 
Communication, the EU aims to step up political dialogue, change the agenda and format of bi-
regional meetings and strengthen cooperation on conflict prevention. In relation to economic matters, 
it proposes to complete the ‘network’ of association agreements with the rest of Latin America and 
support integration processes, which the Commission will monitor closely. It also proposes a more 
intense dialogue on the environment, barriers to trade and investment and calls for more intensive 
European Investment Bank support for developing regional infrastructure. It states that social cohesion 
is a ‘priority area’ of EU-Latin American relations and calls for a series of political dialogue and 
cooperation initiatives. In addition, it called for the creation of a Euro-Latin American Parliamentary 
Assembly and an EU-LA higher education area, to which the Vienna Summit later gave the ‘green 
light’. This Communication was supported by the European Parliament, in the Salafranca Report, in 
2006, although the European Parliament insisted on the need to give greater emphasis to EU-LA 
cooperation and set the strategic goal of a bi-regional agreement by 2012. 
 
 
2.4 Regional cooperation and support for integration, regionalism and social 
cohesion 
 
The European Community is one of the few promoters of regional cooperation in Latin America and 
the only one involved in bi-regional cooperation. The regional cooperation budget framework 
exclusively for Latin America during the period 2002-2006 amounted to EUR 264 million for the 
regional programmes referred to below and for social initiatives, disaster prevention, sustainable 
energy management and the Europe-Latin America Relations Observatory. The general horizontal 
policies and purely bilateral activities implemented under the ALA Regulation must be added to these. 
The Community has also established EIB funding lines of EUR 40 million for the Andean 
Development Corporation, and EUR 35 million with the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration. A cooperation agreement has been in place with the IADB since 2002, and in 2001 a co-
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financing framework agreement was signed with the World Bank to support the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries initiative. 
 
Regional cooperation has been very uneven because of a serious and ongoing problem in terms of 
defining its counterpart, since there is no Latin America-wide integration organisation, and the 
regional integration ‘map’ is actually formed by four subregions – Mercosur, the Andean Community, 
Central America and Caricom – plus the special cases of ‘South-North’ integration such as Mexico 
and Chile. In these circumstances, support for Latin American integration is difficult, and the EU has 
opted for regional programmes based on thematic ‘networks’ and consortia made up largely by 
decentralised stakeholders – local governments, universities, etc. – that promote ‘regionalisation’ 
rather than formalised and institutionalised regionalism. According to the evaluations carried out, the 
results of the EC regional programme for Latin America in force from 2002 to 2006 were positive in 
terms of each of its programmes and the significant participation of the decentralised stakeholders, but 
it was not designed to support subregional integration and has not had that effect. Some Latin 
American governments, meanwhile, question the regional programme, which they do not control, and 
would like the resources involved to be channelled bilaterally so that their own countries obtain more 
funds (Development Researchers Network 2005). The following is a very brief summary of the most 
relevant specific programmes:  
 
- Al-Invest: starting in 1993 with a pilot stage, this first bi-regional programme developed in 
three further stages (stage I, 1996-2000; stage II, 2000-2004; and stage III, 2004-2007). In the 
latter stage the budget amounted to EUR 53 million. Its objectives – based on mutual interest, 
the provision of services to EU enterprises and to Latin American countries to stimulate trade 
and investment – were formulated ex-post following a 2001 evaluation. This concluded that the 
programme had been positive, particularly for SMEs, though it questioned its sustainability 
without continued EU support (Europeaid 2001). The programme has also suffered from 
imbalances in the allocation of resources per country, which must be corrected.  
 
- URB-AL: this two-stage programme (1996-2000 and 2000-2006) was very successful in 
supporting common projects and local authority thematic networks for exchanging government 
and local development practice. A 1999 evaluation was positive and it had a budget of EUR 50 
million in the second stage. A second evaluation in 2004 corroborated these results, but drew 
attention to the difficulties arising out of the institutional weakness of small local communities 
(Europeaid 2004). 
 
- ALFA (Latin America-Academic Training): this programme promotes student, researcher and 
teacher exchanges between European and Latin American higher education institution networks 
or consortia. It developed in two stages (Alfa I, 1994-1999; Alfa II, 2000-2005), the second 
having a budget of EUR 54 million. Some 770 institutions from the two regions were involved. 
The evaluations (Europeaid 2002) were positive, despite high stage I management costs that 
were subsequently rectified, and showed increasing ‘ownership’ by Latin American universities.  
 
- ALBAN: this programme, running from 2002 to 2010, offers ‘high-level’ scholarships to Latin 
American students for postgraduate studies in the EU. It has a budget of EUR 88 million and is 
managed by a university consortium. Demand for the programme is strong, with an average of 
around 800 scholarships awarded per year. The statistics and intermediate evaluation 
(Europeaid 2005) show that it offers added value compared to bilateral programmes and enables 
academic and scientific cooperation links to be generated between the two regions by means of 
research projects by scholarship holders. Since it is a demand-driven programme which is 
more appropriate to upper middle-income countries, there are significant imbalances 
between recipient and host countries, and the least developed Latin American states obtain 
few scholarships. Its individualised approach has, moreover, been questioned since it does 
not strengthen the capacities of the region's universities.  
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- @LIS (Latin America, information society): this originates from sectoral dialogues on the 
information society, its basic aim being to reduce the ‘digital divide’ between the two regions 
and to promote dialogue on standards and rules. It ran from 2002 to 2006 with a budget of 
EUR 77 million, its activities including ‘pilot projects’. One of the more successful measures is 
the ALICE network (Latin America interconnected with Europe), coordinated by the CLARA 
and DANTE networks (Latin America and EU respectively), to create a broadband network 
between the two regions’ scientific institutions. Although it has not yet been evaluated, demand 
for this programme was strong, it helped to create Latin American networks (CLARA), its 
network design was more in keeping with Latin American expectations, in contrast to a bilateral 
United States initiative, and it was in addition compatible with the EU’s more general objectives 
in the global regulation of the information society (Development Researchers Network 2005: 
68).  
 
- Eurosocial: launched at the Guadalajara Summit with an appropriation of EUR 30 million, 
two years in arrears of the announcement of the Madrid Summit’s ‘social initiative’, this 
programme has effectively been in progress since 2006. The evaluation began in late 2007, 
which is why only the preliminary results are available (Grupo Soges, 2008). Eurosocial is 
based on thematic networks: education, taxation, health, justice and employment. Its evaluation 
suggests that it has helped to raise the profile of bi-regional dialogue on social cohesion, 
although the dynamism shown by each network is unequal: greater in taxation, education and 
employment, a little less in justice, and very low in health, due inter alia to the backlogs that 
have built up in its implementation. The evaluation highlights how consistent the programme is 
with national social and employment policies, and the added value of European experience, 
though the latter has not always been duly incorporated. It should be noted as regards 
weaknesses that due to its marked national approach, subregional measures have not been 
involved, except for Mercosur’s social and labour agenda, which has prevented Eurosocial from 
properly complementing EU action in the area of regional integration. Finally, as regards 
employment the impact of the association agreements and free trade has not been taken 
sufficiently into account. 
 
- OBREAL/EULARO – EU-Latin America Relations Observatory: this project was developed 
from 2004 to 2007 through a consortium coordinated by the University of Barcelona. With a 
budget of EUR 1.3 million, meetings and studies were organised to monitor bi-regional 
relations. Although it has not yet been evaluated, the methodology used – selection of a 
consortium, leaving others out – made it difficult for centres specialising in EU-LA relations to 
take part and does not guarantee the need to continue and to consolidate activities which, in 
addition to the appropriate monitoring of bi-regional relations, help to meet one of the needs 
highlighted in the December 2005 Commission Communication: mutual knowledge.  
 
Subregional programmes with Mercosur, the Andean Community and Central America have been 
more important in supporting integration and regionalism and have involved the regional institutions 
as a contact point, although the financial commitment has been rather low: from 1996 to 2003, Latin 
America received a total of EUR 3 480 million, which includes both allocations from the PVD/ALA 
regulation and horizontal budget lines. Of these funds, 72% correspond to bilateral actions, 17% to 
regional programmes (ALFA, URB-AL, AL-Invest, ATLAS, ALURE, ALIS) and 12% to subregional 
programmes: 8% for Central America; 3% for the Andean Community and 1% for Mercosur. In 
addition, only part of these funds have been directed towards specific integration projects, such as 
programmes for establishing customs unions, particularly in Central America and the Andean 
Community, the consolidation of regional institutions, support for the harmonisation of regulations, 
quality standards, customs cooperation, specialist training and improvement of statistical capacities. 
Although they are not in keeping with specific integration agreements, EC projects in areas such as 
cross-border cooperation or water basin navigation also meet that objective (Paraná, Pilcomayo). 
 
A basic premise allowing these measures to produce positive results is the degree of cohesion and 
intra-group cooperation, and in particular the commitment of Latin American governments themselves 
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to integration and its institutions. The EC has nevertheless provided support during a period of serious 
crisis for integration when regional integration methods and maps are being redefined, and this has 
obviously conditioned the results of EC projects. Latin American integration is currently marked by 
uncertainty and a proliferation of trade commitments, some of which are difficult to reconcile, at the 
same time as problems that have built up over many years have remained unresolved, such as 
institutional weakness and ineffectiveness, the continuation of trade barriers and the absence of 
mechanisms to correct disparities (CEPAL 2005: 81; Durán and Maldonado 2005: 19-26). The EC 
has, for example, committed substantial funds to support the establishment of the Andean customs 
union, but the schedules agreed have not been met, and the objective has been postponed several times 
and has been abandoned. Not only does this failure damage the reputation of Andean integration and 
its members, but it also affects the EC.  
 
In the case of Central America, the evaluation of regional cooperation (Development Researchers 
Network 2007) shows that it had a positive impact on furthering the economic aspect of regional 
integration, particularly in connection with the customs union. In other areas the results are uneven. 
The strategy has proved to be less effective in the areas of institutional, legislative and social 
development, partly because the regional institutions for which some of the resources were intended 
have not had due government backing, and partly because the strategy focuses on strengthening 
integration institutions rather than programmes fostering ties with other regions. The evaluation also 
highlights serious shortcomings in coordination with member countries and lack of complementarity 
between bilateral and Community action. This shows that the effectiveness of cooperation owes a 
great deal to political dialogue, particularly the ‘joint evaluation process’ carried out since 2004, 
which has been a significant catalyst for integration. As a prominent Central American diplomat said 
in Brussels, ‘this process has enabled more progress to be made in six months than in the previous six 
years’.13 
 
In the Communication on A Stronger Partnership between the EU and Latin America, adopted in 
December 2005, the Commission sets out the need to complete the network of association agreements 
involving all the countries of the region and liable to contribute to the integration of them all, recalling 
that the course of action taken by the EU must be tailored to the new realities in Latin America, and 
that the integration processes are evolving, as demonstrated by the recent creation of the South 
American Community of Nations and the subsequent South American Union (European Commission, 
2005: 5). As the Commission points out, it is important to be attentive to the changes taking place in 
the regional integration ‘map’, particularly as regards Andean Community-Mercosur convergence, 
Mercosur enlargement and the structure of Unasur. Subject to the existence of more far-reaching 
agreements, prospects for liberalising South American trade with pre-established dates suggest that the 
European Parliament’s proposal to move towards a bi-regional free trade area should be reviewed, 
while the schedule initially provided for should be adjusted.  
 
The relationship between social cohesion and free trade agreements, however, also raises an important 
problem of policy coherence for the EU. Social cohesion is one of the principal objectives of inter-
regional relations and helps to shape the EU’s profile and identity as a ‘civil power’ in its relations 
with Latin America. In the area of trade, however, the association agreements correspond to the 
‘WTO-plus’ model and are very similar to those promoted by the United States. It is doubtful whether 
this type of agreement fosters a positive relationship between free trade and social cohesion, a crucial 
issue in the current development agenda and the combating of poverty and inequality in Latin 
America. In particular, the possible negotiation of association agreements with Central American and 
Andean countries raises major problems regarding the treatment of disparities and their impact on 
social cohesion due to the lower level of development of these countries. If such agreements are 
signed and the preferences of the SPG+ in force until 2008 are left behind, the incentives connected to 
labour and social rights, good governance and the environment will have to be maintained. Similarly, 
the links between trade and the environment are also not appropriately addressed in this type of 
                                                 
13 Author’s interview with representatives of GRUCA in Brussels, November 2006.  
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agreement. Cooperation measures can play a role in this respect, but it must be remembered that that is 
not their objective and they are not very well designed to address that problem. 
 
Unasur is probably not sufficiently well established to open an institutionalised dialogue and 
cooperation framework with the EU. Nevertheless, its very gradual consolidation – the institution’s 
founding treaty will be signed by June 2008 – could be backed by the EU’s next regional strategy by 
means of cooperation measures. In view of the changes occurring in Latin American integration, a 
broader integration strategy must be developed that does not depend on the development of trade 
commitments. Such a strategy should emphasise more far-reaching economic integration through 
macroeconomic convergence and sectoral policies; the management of interdependence that affects 
regional and local development, such as cross-border cooperation; the management of water basins 
and natural spaces; regional networks of cities; the development of tourist routes; disaster risk 
reduction and mitigation; and bottom-up regionalisation processes by establishing civil society 
regional networks that can play an active role in the process. A particularly important aspect of this 
strategy is support for mechanisms to correct the disparities arising out of changes in production 
systems, in the interests of income convergence and social and territorial cohesion, that can become 
established in integration processes, and the support the EU can provide for them. More specifically, 
and irrespective of whether this fund is established or not, the EU would send out a clear political 
signal in support of the Mercosur structural convergence fund (or the fund that comes to be created in 
Central America) as an instrument of a nascent intra-Mercosur ‘cohesion policy’.  
 
In the context of relations and political dialogue with Latin America, meanwhile, and acknowledging 
the maturity and degree of development achieved by the region’s countries as MICs, it is important to 
open a dialogue on the ‘South-South’ cooperation being developed in the region by both regional and 
extra-regional donors in order to ensure more coordinated and effective cooperation and to examine 
‘triangular’ methods of support together with those that have a greater impact and added value in 
terms of capacity building, institutional improvement and priority sectors in the light of the MDGs.14  
 
In terms of energy and infrastructure, cooperation with South American initiatives is a significant 
component of the new integration agenda and meets shared interests, since it addresses one of the 
‘bottlenecks’ of Latin American development, helps to ensure that the EU has diversified sources of 
supply, can prevent bilateral disputes that may destabilise the area and can support European 
investment in the sector. These interests may be better promoted if the EU commits itself with more 
resources. Although the Commission does not have sufficient funds to contemplate infrastructure or 
energy measures, since they are very costly, the EU could promote greater EIB participation beyond 
the mutual interest provided for in the new mandate for the period 2007-2013, which will have a 
budget of EUR 2 480 million for Asia and Latin America to support regional integration in energy 
infrastructure, communications, environmental management and cross-border cooperation, in 
association with integration banks such as the ADC or CABEI. 
 
The political cooperation agenda must also be broadened in order to adapt it to what is being done in 
the EU and in the various Latin American regional groups, including the links between regionalism 
and democratic governance, regional security and conflict prevention. To achieve this the EU can 
promote specialised dialogue between public, private and civil society stakeholders and encourage 
regional institutions to help to resolve the region’s political crises through a broader process of 
consultation with the EU Council in the framework of the CFSP. To that end the European Parliament 
proposal (2006) to create a bi-regional conflict prevention centre devoted to the early detection of 
causes of potential violent armed conflicts and the best way to prevent them and stop them from 
escalating is particularly relevant. 
 
As has been said, promoting mutual knowledge is a regional strategy priority. There are many 
dimensions to this objective, one of which concerns study centres looking at situations in both regions. 
                                                 
14 See in this respect the European Commission’s position (2006) set out in point 1.4 of its Communication 
Governance in the European Consensus on Development, and the DAC document (2006).  
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It has already been said that EULARO has not managed to fulfil that objective. A specific proposal to 
ensure stability for this type of activity would be to create a permanent bi-regional platform whose 
priority objectives included improving mutual knowledge, broadening participation by the many 
stakeholders involved in bi-regional relations and monitoring the bi-regional agenda. This body, which 
could be called the Europe-Latin America Foundation, would be public-private, similar to the Asia-
Europe Foundation (http://www.asef.org/), established in 1997. This institution would raise the profile 
of bi-regional relations by having distinguished personalities from the two regions on its advisory 
board. Its remit would cover studies, informal bi-regional dialogue, training and the promotion of 
exchanges, including culture. Although it would originally be set up in one of the regions, it should 
eventually have two bases to achieve a greater impact. As regards its funding, while the Commission 
would have to provide the initial seed capital, institutional contributions from various Member States, 
Latin American governments and private organisations would be essential in order to guarantee its 
sustainability and independence (Freres and Sanahuja, 2006: 84).  
 
Communication with the outside world and training in the Commission would also have to be 
promoted. In relation to the former, it seems that some Commission delegations seek to respond to 
requests for information alone, but the lack of ‘care’ in dealing with local ‘Europhiles’ seeking support 
for organising events, carrying our research or publishing analyses or studies on some EU issue is 
particularly worrying; these are key ‘allies’ for the extensive dissemination of knowledge concerning 
the EU (and its relations with Latin America), and the cost of such support could be low. 
 
 
2.5. The emerging role of cooperation in science, technology and higher education 
 
Although cooperation in science and technology is not a priority cooperation area, according to the 
European Consensus on Development it is particularly relevant to the region’s upper middle-income 
countries. These have certain capacities in terms of national R+D+I policies and reasonably high-level 
scientific research centres, although the situations in the region are very different, and there are 
significant shortcomings in research personnel training and R+D expenditure. There is also a notable 
imbalance between research activities and technological development. In particular, only three 
countries in the region – Brazil, Chile and Cuba – allocate more than 0.5 % of GDP to science and 
technology. By way of comparison, the average in the OECD stands at 2.4% compared to 2% in the 
EU, while only Brazil goes above 0.7% of GDP. Overall, this indicator has stagnated in the last ten 
years and has even fallen in some countries, the highest growth being recorded in Mexico and Brazil. 
Scientific output as a whole has increased in the same period – Latin America represented 1.8% of the 
references in the Science Citation Index (SCI) in 1993 and 3.26% in 2002, while Brazil accounts for 
over 50% of them – but the patent generation ratio is still very low and they are concentrated in Brazil, 
the source of 90% of the region’s patents, followed by Cuba. A particularly important issue in relation 
to strengthening Latin American endogenous capacity is the low number of scientific and research 
personnel with doctorates, which in turn prevents the region from having sufficient doctoral 
programmes.15  
 
These countries have traditionally sought more resources from the EU in this area. Cooperation in 
science and technology has moreover been incorporated into bi-regional political dialogue by means 
of specific ministerial dialogue. This gave rise to the Brazilia Declaration, adopted on 22 March on the 
eve of the second EU-LAC Summit, which expressed both regions’ aspiration to create a common 
area of knowledge. The conference also established the following thematic priorities: health and 
quality of life; information society; economic growth in a globalised environment; sustainable 
development and urbanisation; cultural heritage. Cooperation should therefore also focus on cross-
cutting areas: the strengthening of innovation capacity, with special reference to SMEs; education, 
research personnel capacity building and mobility, networks of centres of excellence and the 
strengthening of national R+D capacities.  
                                                 
15 Sebastián, 2007: xviii-xxii, with information from the Red Iberoamericana de Ciencia y Tecnología (RICYT).  
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Since it is not included in development cooperation policy and is part of other Community policies, 
cooperation in science, technology and higher education has tended to be rather piecemeal, making it 
difficult to access for Latin American countries (Nupia 2008). As has been said, some of the 
programmes, such as ALFA and Albán, come under development cooperation policy and have been 
managed by Europeaid. This is also the institutional framework for ALIS and AL-Invest, which are 
also directly related to technology and support for scientific research. Other cooperation programmes 
in higher education are overseen by the Education and Training Directorate. This includes the 
Erasmus-Mundus and Jean Monnet programmes. Latin America has also been able to take part in the 
EU research and development framework programme by means of its international cooperation 
projects (INCO), and countries that have signed bilateral cooperation agreements in science and 
technology have been able to take part in other aspects of the project on a reciprocal basis with their 
European partners.  
 
Cooperation in science and technology agreements are actually one of the most novel kinds of bi-
regional cooperation. They have been signed with Argentina (1999), Chile (2002), Brazil (2004) and 
Mexico (2004). Their principle is to allow reciprocal access to the framework programme by 
broadening the conditions of access to INCO. For some signatory countries these agreements extend a 
very long-standing cooperation. Argentina, for example, began cooperation in science and technology 
with the EU in 1986 and has taken part in 222 projects to a value of around EUR 221 million. The 
agreements also allow the establishment of a channel for dialogue with these countries that helps to 
direct measures towards areas in which capacities exist and which can generate synergies with 
production sectors with greater potential for incorporating production technology and knowledge, and 
with priority development sectors: biotechnology, the food sector, environment and climate change, 
natural disasters, etc.  
 
Access to these programmes has been hampered by various factors involving both the way in which 
they are structured in the EU and constraints in the Latin American countries (Nupia 2008): lack of 
and dispersal of information, the complexity of notification systems and lack of previous links 
between European and Latin American research centres. The most significant difficulties for Latin 
America are the dispersal of research topics and agendas and the primacy of national and bilateral 
rather than regional agendas (intra-Latin American scientific and technological cooperation is very 
weak, which hinders cooperation with third parties); dispersal of R+D centres; dispersal of the 
research agendas of stakeholders operating in this field, such as the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) and the Organisation of Iberoamerican States for Education, Science and Culture (OEI), 
particularly its important Science and Technology for Development programme; the poor management 
capacity of the Latin American centres (the training of managers should be a priority for cooperation 
in this field); and in general the absence or weakness of national R+D+I policies, since in recent years 
many countries have opted for neoliberal economic policies that have been passive in this area, tying 
the transfer of technology to foreign investment. In this context it is important to highlight the policy 
inconsistency that may exist between technology transfer commitments included in MDG 8 and those 
that have been adopted (albeit very generally) in EU-LAC political dialogue, and the current design of 
the association agreements as regards rules for protecting intellectual property.  
 
This diagnosis gives rise to certain criteria that may help to strengthen cooperation in science and 
technology. First, communication and networks to facilitate access must be promoted. Second, greater 
emphasis must be placed on building the capacities of the centres rather than merely supporting 
individual researchers, as Alban or Erasmus-Mundus do (the latter more recently), ensuring that 
scholarship programmes are connected to broader projects and that research personnel are brought 
back within them. Efforts must be geared towards training managers. Finally, emphasis must be placed 
on the Latin American centres’ communication and coordination in terms of both political dialogue 
and cooperation programmes.  
 
Giving fresh impetus to the Euro-Latin American area of education, besides its educational aims, 
could make a significant contribution to the goal of improving mutual knowledge. One proposal in this 
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area is to set up a ‘Fulbright’ type programme of prestigious scholarships. Although this was in part 
intended to be an objective of the ‘Albán’ scholarships, the latter are generally considered not to have 
fulfilled that role, and in this regard a cherry-picking approach would not be the best way to strengthen 
higher education. It will also in any event be important to respond to the EU’s increasing interest in 
young Latin American students, in competition with the United States, where costs are higher and 
barriers to access are growing. The EU has a strategic interest in becoming a first-class international 
academic benchmark, and this area could contribute to that end16.  
 
Enhanced cooperation in this field could become a strand of relations with the region, particularly with 
the most advanced countries, for which other types of cooperation in social sectors are less relevant. In 
the context of a more differentiated cooperation policy with Latin America and the Caribbean, with 
the programmatic tools (budget support, sector-wide approaches) carrying greater weight for the 
poorest countries, European scientific and technological cooperation could be one of the most 
important components of advanced cooperation with upper middle-income countries, as well as an 
opportunity for triangular cooperation and support for regional policies and for integration.  
 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS 
 
This strategy document has highlighted the principal changes arising in development cooperation with 
Latin America: the adoption of an international development and anti-poverty agenda dominated by 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG); reflection on appropriate strategies for achieving those 
goals in the middle-income countries; the increasing involvement of the latter in development 
cooperation by means of ‘post-liberal regionalism’ policies and the growth of ‘South-South’ 
cooperation; and demands for ownership, alignment, harmonisation, mutual accountability and 
management for results of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.  
 
Against this background, EU development cooperation over the last ten years has changed 
significantly to adapt to the above requirements, particularly in its strategic orientation towards the 
MDGs and poverty reduction, administrative reform, planning and programming, the three ‘Cs’ 
(coordination, complementarity and coherence) and the rationalisation of budget instruments and lines. 
These changes have been recognised by the Development Assistance Committee’s evaluation of 
cooperation (2007c). The latter’s recommendations are particularly important in connection with the 
following: the need to ensure the integrity of the EU’s development and poverty eradication agenda, 
ensuring that cross-cutting issues such as gender and the environment are duly addressed; the special 
nature of Community assistance and the need for greater Community and Member State specialisation 
on the basis of their respective comparative advantages; the need to ensure policy coherence by 
bringing this issue to the decision-making level; and closer coordination within the Commission 
between its various departments, from the delegations in developing countries onwards, and by means 
of ‘whole-of-government’ approaches at developing-country level, especially as regards democratic 
governance, security system reform and gender. The evaluation also recommends that the delegations 
be given a broader role in designing and implementing programmes and in furthering dialogue with 
civil society organisations.  
 
A great effort in the area of cooperation with Latin America has been made to adapt to the above 
demands, particularly in terms of national and subregional programming. Significant challenges 
remain, however, due partly to the change in the economic and political cycle taking place in the 
region. These challenges are particularly visible in regional cooperation. Through the strategy devised 
by the EU for a ‘stronger partnership’ and the commitments assumed at the Vienna Summit in 2006, 
EU-Latin America relations are moving towards the building of a ‘network’ of association agreements 
that will involve a qualitative change from the guidelines followed in recent years. At regional level 
                                                 
16 See the conclusions of the panel of experts on the EU-Latin America area of higher education at the 
international seminar ‘Intercontinental cooperation between the EU and Latin America related to the issues of 
poverty, development and democracy’, Vienna, 24-26 April 2006. 
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the 2007-2013 programming is a ‘framework document’ to some extent and some of the main 
programmes are yet to be defined, while others are being changed and relaunched in line with the 
corresponding evaluations. Opportunities for regional cooperation to innovate and to adapt are 
therefore being opened up. 
 
In this context the following strategies and proposals are relevant to EU-Latin America cooperation:  
  
- Maintain aid to middle-income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Development 
cooperation is a key element of bi-regional relations, and EU and Member State commitment 
to the MDGs should not lead to a reduction in aid to the region, since that would have a 
negative effect on its work in the area of poverty and inequality reduction, the achievement of 
other development goals and democratic governance and its contribution to the provision of 
regional and global public goods. This also means playing an active role in achieving an 
international consensus on cooperation with the MICs described above.  
 
- Greater gradual increases in aid and concentration on the special characteristics of middle-
income countries. According to the European Consensus on Development, the EU must 
continue to direct resources towards the region’s low-income countries, particularly in the 
Andean area and Central America, using tools such as budget support and a sector-wide 
approach through national development and poverty reduction strategies. At the same time, 
cooperation with upper middle-income countries should continue to focus on areas in which 
cooperation can be more effective due to those countries’ circumstances: macroeconomic and 
international financial stability so that they can continue to attract funds from other external 
sources; institutional capacity-building and/or policy design, in particular to make public 
policy more effective and efficient; tax reforms ensuring adequately funded and sustainable 
redistributive policies and investment in human capital; national production capacities and 
policies for improving international competitiveness, particularly the fostering of investment 
in infrastructure; improvements in national research, development and innovation systems 
(R+D+I); and support for social stakeholders promoting political, institutional and legislative 
change at both national and international level, and those with the capacity to mobilise 
additional resources, such as multilateral or subregional banks. 
 
- Improving aid effectiveness: EU leadership. According to the European Consensus on 
Development, the EU and the European Commission in particular must take the lead in 
applying the Paris Declaration and international commitments on aid effectiveness, which in 
Latin America are particularly relevant for lower middle-income countries in which a large 
number of donors are involved, and for Haiti. Improving coordination and complementarity 
with Member States is particularly important. The application of this agenda, however, must 
avoid the risk of overlooking civil society stakeholders, who continue to play an important 
role in defining national development agendas and in democratic governance.  
 
- The key role of the association agreements. When generating development opportunities for 
the middle-income countries, association agreements can play an even more important role 
than transfers of aid, since they ensure access to external markets, promote external 
investment and foster innovation and competitiveness. If they are to play a positive role in 
development, however, disparities must also be duly recognised and they must be designed to 
allow the implementation of active policies that enable adjustment costs to be offset and the 
transformation of production to be promoted, particularly in the case of agreements with the 
Andean Community and Central America. 
 
- Association agreements, social cohesion and policy coherence. As has been said, the 
relationship between social cohesion and the free trade component of association agreements 
raises a significant problem of policy coherence for the EU. In the area of trade, the 
association agreements correspond to the ‘WTO-plus’ model and are very similar to those 
promoted by the United States. As pointed out in the preceding section, ensuring that these 
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agreements have a positive impact on social cohesion requires appropriate treatment of 
asymmetries, support for policies to improve competitiveness and, if the GSP+ preferences in 
force until 2008 are abandoned, the incentives connected to labour and social rights, good 
governance and the environment that characterised those preferences would have to be 
maintained. 
 
- An extended strategy of support for regional integration. Support for regionalism and 
integration is a key element of the development agenda of Latin American and Caribbean 
MICs because of its potential and actual contribution to developing the production fabric and 
employment, to governance and institutional capacity-building, and to the provision of 
regional public goods. Such support has proved to be even more important in a context of 
crisis and change in integration. The EU must maintain this support through a broader strategy 
that is not dictated by the development of trade commitments and that combines political 
dialogue, the process for signing bi-regional association agreements – in this context the mere 
possibility of signing bilateral agreements with some countries from each group is a powerful 
force for disintegration – and development assistance via subregional strategies for the 
Andean Community, Central America and Mercosur. In these circumstances it is important to 
be aware of the changes occurring in the regional integration ‘map’, particularly as regards 
Andean Community-Mercosur convergence, the enlargement of Mercosur and formation of 
the Union of South American Nations (Unasur). Cooperation with the subregional groups 
must also adapt to the new regional integration agendas, which go beyond trade liberalisation 
and extend to fields such as: the furthering of economic integration through macroeconomic 
convergence and sectoral policies; political cooperation, peace and security, transport and 
energy infrastructure integration and cross-border cooperation; the management of water 
basins and natural spaces; disaster risk reduction and mitigation; ‘bottom-up’ regionalisation 
by the formation of regional civil society networks that can play an active role in the process; 
and the correction of regional disparities to ensure income convergence and social and 
territorial cohesion. It could in particular be extremely useful for the EU to provide financial 
and/or institutional support for the tools and funds established or which the various 
subregional groups may establish to counter such disparities, such as the Mercosur structural 
convergence fund (FOCEM), or which could be created within the framework of the Central 
American customs union.  
 
- Greater attention to ‘South-South’ cooperation by means of triangular cooperation 
mechanisms. The increase in ‘South-South’ cooperation confirms the growing role of the more 
advanced Latin American countries in the region’s integration processes and development. 
Such cooperation provides opportunities for the EU in terms of: the mobilisation of additional 
resources, both financial, human and technical; adaptation to the region’s needs; greater 
involvement of Latin American stakeholders; and the strengthening of the institutional 
capacities of donors and recipients alike. In some respects the regional programmes and their 
methodology of working with ‘networks’ of decentralised stakeholders may be an appropriate 
basis for promoting this type of cooperation.  
 
- Mobilisation of additional resources. To achieve the above as a whole, the establishment of a 
‘bi-regional solidarity fund’ proposed by the European Parliament in 2001 continues to be of 
interest. As pointed out in a viability study of this fund (Ayuso 2006), this instrument could 
support a type of cooperation geared more towards supporting regional integration and the 
provision of regional public goods. The fund should therefore focus on sectors in which the 
regional dimension is essential or contributes greater added value. The fund’s sphere of 
activity would be region-wide policies fostering interdependence, countering problems 
affecting global common goods and helping to eliminate disparities and combat poverty. 
These specifically include: the fostering of social cohesion; linkage infrastructure; the 
environment; regional energy policy; cultural cooperation; the combating of drug trafficking 
and criminal organisations; conflict resolution and cross-border security. In this context the 
EU can also promote greater EIB participation going beyond the mutual interest provided for 
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in the new mandate for the period 2007-2013, so as to support regional integration by means 
of energy and communications infrastructure projects and other fields, in cooperation with 
subregional banks such as the ADC or CABEI. 
 
- Improvement of mutual knowledge and social participation in bi-regional relations. A 
permanent bi-regional organisation must be established whose priorities include expanding the 
participation of the many stakeholders involved in bi-regional relations and monitoring the bi-
regional agenda. This organisation, which could be called the Euro-Latin America Foundation, 
would be a public-private initiative, with the Commission and the European Parliament 
playing an important role in its implementation, strategic orientation and funding. 
  
- A comprehensive strategy for cooperation in science and technology. The increasing 
importance of research, development and innovation (R+D+I) for Latin American and 
Caribbean MICs requires a comprehensive strategy that encompasses EU-LAC relations as a 
whole. Ministerial level political dialogue has already begun, and significant development 
cooperation initiatives exist. It is nevertheless important to ensure the consistency of 
technology transfer commitments adopted within such dialogue, the current design of the 
association agreements as regards rules for protecting intellectual property and the need to 
supplement their free trade component with policies for improving competitiveness. The 
current dispersal of instruments must be rectified and measures must be taken to ensure that 
they help to strengthen national R+D+I capacities. 
 
- Towards a Euro-Latin American and Caribbean higher education area. The building of an 
EU-LAC common area of higher education and research is part of the bi-regional agenda of 
social cohesion, regional integration and mutual knowledge of the ‘strategic partnership'. A 
programme of student, teacher and researcher mobility between the two regions must be 
designed, developed and appropriately funded, and on the basis of the positive experience 
recorded in both regions – including ‘South-South’ educational cooperation – it must involve a 
multilateral network approach based on existing educational and research institutions and 
networks. It is therefore important to ensure automatic recognition of studies in all academic 
subjects undertaken in an institution from the other region at all levels of higher education 
(degree, master's and doctorate), something that requires appropriate and reliable accreditation 
systems. More than offering individual scholarships, this programme must foster and develop 
research-based centres of excellence and must bring mobility into both parties' research 
projects. 
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Annexes 
 
 
 
Classification of Latin American and Caribbean countries according to levels of 
income on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list 
 
 
Least developed 
countries (LDCs) 
Other low-income 
countries 
Annual income per 
capita below $825 in 
2004 
Lower middle-income 
countries 
Annual income per 
capita between $825 
and $3 255 in 2004  
Upper middle-income 
countries 
Annual income per 
capita above $3 255 in 
2004 
Haiti 
 
Nicaragua Bolivia 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Dominican Rep. 
Surinam 
Argentina 
Belize 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Dominica 
Grenada 
Mexico 
Panama 
Uruguay  
Venezuela 
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Financial flows to Latin America and the Caribbean, 1998-2006 
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Development of assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean by all DAC donors  
(USD million, current prices) 
 
ODA-category 1997 2001 2006 
Total ODA, gross disbursements 4 839.95 5 463.15 6 365.44 
Total ODA, net disbursements 3 927.01 4 456.30 5 235.66 
Total ODA, excluding debt relief  3 607.56 3 942.68 4 757.10 
 
Source: OECD 
 
 
 
Proportion of world net ODA for which Latin America accounts  
(percentage of total ODA, 1994-2005) 
 
 
Source: Xalma 2007, p. 30, with OECD data  
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Official Development Assistance in Latin America, 2006 
 
Recipient country Total ODA in 2006 
(net disbursements, 
USD million, current 
prices) 
ODA as percentage 
of GDP 
(2006) 
ODA per capita 
(USD) 
 
Antigua and Barbuda 3.28 0.340% 47.20 
Argentina 114.07 0.053% 2.83 
Bahamas ... … … 
Barbados -0.55 -0.009% /b … 
Belize 7.61 0.625% 25.85 
Bolivia 580.67 5.201% 63.67 
Brazil 82.42 0.007% 0.43 
Chile 83.01 0.056% 5.09 
Colombia 988.2 0.727% 22.26 
Costa Rica 23.7 0.107% 5.73 
Cuba /c 78.26 0.195% 6.68 
Dominica 19.36 6.453% 267.45 
Ecuador 188.78 0.462% 13.72 
El Salvador 157.34 0.859% 22.64 
Grenada 26.81 5.165% 297.98 
Guatemala 487.17 1.380% 38.27 
Guyana 172.93 19.3% 224.84 
Haiti 581.42 11.719% 66.78 
Honduras 587.4 6.360% 78.48 
Jamaica 36.72 0.348% 13.20 
Mexico 246.67 0.029% 2.26 
Nicaragua 732.65 13.645% 129.09 
Panama 30.44 0.178% 9.38 
Paraguay 56.13 0.616% 8.41 
Peru 467.86 0.501% 16.31 
Dominican Rep. 53.03 0.173% 5.66 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 5.16 1.059% 131.13 
S. Vincent/Grenadines 4.73 1.015% 40.03 
Saint Lucia 18.45 2.036% 108.11 
Surinam 63.78 3.993% 135.47 
Trinidad and Tobago 12.97 0.065% 12.27 
Uruguay 20.77 0.107% 6.00 
Venezuela (Rep. of)  58.3 0.032% 2.24 
 
a) Cuban GDP, CIA World Fact Book 2007 estimates 
Sources: OECD ODA data. GDP data obtained from the World Bank. World Bank Development Indicators 
Database. 
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Development of ALBA by Presidential summits, 2004-2008 
 
Summit Principal agreements and initiatives  
I Summit 
Havana, 
14/12/2004 
-  Formation of ALBA by Venezuela and Cuba, adoption of its 12 principles. 
-  Extension of Cooperation Agreement of 30 October 2000 between Venezuela and Cuba: 
counter-trade; Venezuelan oil on preferential terms, in exchange for 15 000 Cuban doctors for 
‘Misión Barrio Adentro’. 
 
II Summit 
Havana 
27-28/04/2005 
- Adoption of the ALBA Strategic Plan. Signature of 49 cooperation agreements and instruments. 
- Social and health cooperation: 30 000 Cuban doctors and health workers will continue working 
in Venezuela on ‘Misión Barrio Adentro’. Some 45 000 Cuban doctors and health specialists 
will train in Venezuela on ‘Misión Barrio Adentro II’. Another 10 000 Venezuelans will train in 
medicine and nursing in Cuba on ‘Misión Ribas’ and ‘Misión Sucre’. Care and surgery in 
ophthalmology and other specialities for 100 000 Venezuelans. 
- Economic cooperation: agreements for the establishment of joint ventures in various fields. 
Tariff elimination and counter-trade programme.  
- Energy: framework agreement, sales contracts for crude oil, and oil and oil product storage; 
draft agreement to rehabilitate the Cienfuegos refinery, technology transfer between PDVSA 
and Cubana de Petróleos (CUPET); expansion of the Matanzas oil tanker terminal.  
 
III Summit 
Havana 
28-29/04/2006 
- Accession of Bolivia. 
- Signing of ‘People’s Trade Treaty’. 
- Cooperation agreements. Extension to Bolivia of health cooperation measures with Cuba and 
Venezuela: ophthalmology care, 5 000 scholarships to study medicine in Cuba, 600 Cuban 
medical specialists in Bolivia. A USD one billion Venezuelan fund for projects in Bolivia. 
Tariff elimination measures. 
- Petrocaribe and Fondo ALBA-Petrocaribe energy agreement: institutional framework, setting 
up of fund with an initial contribution of USD 50 million from Venezuela. Extension of the 
preferential financing mechanisms in line with the increase in oil prices. 
  
IV Summit 
Caracas 
11/01/2007 
- Accession of Nicaragua. 
- Petrocaribe energy cooperation agreement between Venezuela and Nicaragua (direct supply of 
oil, oil products and gas of up to 10 000 barrels per day). 
- Economic cooperation: Cuba-Venezuela agreements for establishing joint ventures in various 
fields (shipping, railways, insurance). Nicaragua-Venezuela livestock cooperation. 
 
V Summit 
Barquisimeto 
29/04/2007 
- Agreement for drafting ‘People’s Trade Treaties’. 
- Signature of the ALBA-Haití Petión, Bolivar, Martí cooperation agreement.  
- Establishment of social movements: social ‘summit’ and Tintorero Declaration. 
- Institutionalisation of ALBA: Council of Presidents, Council of Ministers, Council of Social 
Movements; Secretariat, Policy Committee, seven thematic committees. 
- Agreements on transnational companies and projects: literacy, culture, supply of industrial 
property, financial cooperation, tourism, mining, agri-foodstuffs sector, air (ALSUR) and water 
transport (Transalba), metallurgical sector and ‘Linea Blanca’. Opening of ‘Casas del ALBA’. 
Mandate to establish the ‘Banco del ALBA’.  
- Venezuelan bilateral agreements with Bolivia, Haiti and Nicaragua for supplying hydrocarbons 
on preferential terms, and earmarking of some ALBA fund resources for infrastructure work 
and social projects in the three countries.  
- ALBA energy treaty: participation in the ‘ALBA Block’ in the Orinoco Belt through the 
‘Petroalba’ transnational company; development of gas-based petrochemical poles; energy 
substitution and efficiency projects. Establishment of Empresa Grannacional de la Energía. 
- Bilateral energy agreements. With Bolivia: fuel distribution, power station, exploration and 
operation of four gas fields; with Cuba: remodelling of Cienfuegos refinery and gasification 
plant; with Nicaragua: refinery and power station project; with Haiti: gasification plant and 
power station. 
-  Political agenda: declarations of support for Cuba on the Posada Carriles case, and support for 
Venezuela on cancellation of the RCTV licence.  
 
VI Summit - Accession of Dominica. 
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Caracas 
24-26/01/2008 
- Political agenda: support for Venezuelan initiatives for ‘humanitarian exchange’ in the conflict 
with Colombia. Proposed creation of a military alliance.  
- Establishment of Banco del ALBA, with an initial capital of USD one billion, and commitment 
to adopt the respective agreement within 60 days. 
- Agreement to establish a transnational energy company within 90 days.  
- Establishment of ‘ALBA Cultural’. 
- Cooperation projects: Venezuela-Cuba underwater cable. 
 
 
Source: drawn up internally, based on information from the Instituto de Altos Estudios Diplomáticos Pedro Gual 
(Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Relaciones Exteriores, Venezuela) 
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Principles of the Paris Declaration (2005) 
 
 
 
Key:  
Apropiación Ownership 
Alineamiento Alignment 
Armonización Harmonisation 
Gestión por resultados Managing for results 
Los países socios definen la agenda Partner countries set the agenda 
Donantes se alinean con la agenda de los socios Donors align with partners countries’ agenda 
Donantes se basan en sistemas de los socios Donors use partners’ systems 
Establecer acuerdos comunes Establish common agreements 
Simplificar procedimientos Simplify procedures 
Compartir información Share information 
 
Ownership: ‘Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies and strategies and coordinate development action’ 
 
Partner countries define their own development strategies through consultative processes; they translate these 
into results-oriented operational programmes appropriate to their budget planning; they take the lead in 
coordinating aid in dialogue with donors and with the participation of civil society and the private sector. 
Donors respect partner country leadership and help build their capacity to exercise it. 
 
 Alignment: ‘Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures’ 
 
All donors align with partners’ national development strategies and link funding to a single framework of 
conditions and/or indicators; they use partner countries’ institutions and systems (public finances, accounting, 
auditing, procurement), where these provide assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes. Partner 
countries and donors establish common frameworks to assess the performance, transparency and accountability 
of country systems. Partner countries will make the reforms necessary to ensure this. Donors will give support 
for institutional and management capacity-building as regards national public finances, rather than undermining 
them with parallel structures.  
Donors will establish reliable indicative multiannual commitments of aid and will disburse it in a timely fashion; 
they will use national government procurement systems when the country has implemented mutually agreed 
processes; and they undertake to untie aid according to DAC criteria. 
 
Harmonisation: ‘Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and effective’ 
 
Donors implement common arrangements and simplify procedures for planning, financing, disbursement, 
monitoring, evaluating and reporting to government, reducing the number of separate field and diagnostic 
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missions. They harmonise environmental impact assessments and other cross-cutting issues. Partner countries 
undertake to define the comparative advantages of donors and their complementarity at country or sector level. 
Donors undertake to use their respective comparative advantages at sector or country level by delegating to 
other donors where appropriate. If these principles are applied to fragile states they need to be adapted to assist 
governability and create institutions that offer security and equitable access to social services. 
 
Managing for results 
 
Partner countries strengthen the linkages between national development strategies and budget processes; they 
establish results-oriented reporting frameworks with manageable and accessible low-cost indicators; and donors 
commit to link programming and resources to results and align them with partner country performance 
assessment frameworks, without introducing performance indicators that are not consistent with their 
development strategies; they harmonise their monitoring and reporting requirements and agree joint formats for 
periodic reporting, until they can rely on partner countries’ statistical and monitoring systems. 
 
Mutual accountability 
Donors and members are accountable for development results 
 
One of the priorities for partner countries and donors is to enhance accountability and transparency. This 
increases public support for national policies and development assistance. Partner countries undertake to 
strengthen the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets; they foster participatory 
approaches and assess progress in implementing those strategies. Donors undertake to provide transparent, 
comprehensive and timely information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive 
budget reports to their parliaments and citizens. 
 
Source: drawn up internally on the basis of the Paris Declaration (2005) 
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Key documents of EU regional strategy for Latin America, 1996-2007 (summary table) 
 
‘The EU and Latin America. The present situation and prospects for closer partnership (1996-2000)’, COM (95) 495, 23 October 1995 
 
Political objectives  
 
Economic objectives  
 
Social objectives  
Interdependence 
management objectives 
Cross-cutting strategies and 
elements  
 
Other aspects  
Joint commitment to 
democracy: rule of law, good 
governance, reform of the 
State and improvements in 
sectoral policies (health, 
education, etc.) 
Support for economic reforms 
and international 
competitiveness. Support for 
private sector. Cooperation in 
science and technology. 
Investment promotion (ECIP 
and AL-Invest). Foreign trade 
promotion 
Support for ‘authentic 
integration’ (free trade plus 
social cohesion) 
Combating of poverty and 
social exclusion, according to 
the priorities of the 
Copenhagen Social Summit. 
Labour rights.  
- Environment: inclusion of 
environmental aspect in all 
measures. Minimum 10% 
cooperation for environmental 
protection projects. 
- Energy: renewables and 
demand management 
(ALURE) 
- Combating of illegal drugs  
- Education and training 
- Support for cooperation and 
regional integration 
- Improvement of 
management: recipient 
participation, coordination 
with Member States, support 
for decentralised cooperation, 
concentration on multiannual 
horizontal programmes 
- Differentiated approach by 
subregions and countries, to 
address lack of comparability 
in LA  
Represents Commission’s 
response to the strategy 
defined by the 1994 
Luxembourg European 
Council.  
The communication 
establishes regional strategy 
for the five-year period 1995-
1999 and the multiannual 
indicative budget for Latin 
America of ECU 1 343 
million. 
 
‘A new European Union-Latin America partnership on the eve of the XXI century’, COM(99) 105, 9 March 1999 
 
Political objectives 
 
Economic objectives 
 
Social objectives 
Interdependence 
management objectives  
Cross-cutting strategies and 
elements 
 
Other aspects 
To set up a ‘strategic 
partnership’ to agree positions 
in international forums on 
peace and security, combat 
illegal activities, promote 
democracy, etc. 
 
Key cooperation issue: 
consolidation of democracy 
and the rule of law, promotion 
of human rights, reform of the 
state 
To strengthen economic and 
trade cooperation 
- To develop markets and 
regional integration through 
common coordinated policies 
(competence) 
- to stabilise financial flows 
and incentives for sustainable 
investment 
 
Key cooperation issue: 
support for regional 
integration and industrial 
cooperation 
Key cooperation issue:  
 
- the fight against poverty and 
social exclusion, link between 
economic and social progress 
- education and training, by 
promoting prestige centres 
supporting cutting-edge 
sectors and technology 
transfer 
- decentralised cooperation in 
the field of culture and artistic 
heritage 
 - Concentration on specific 
sectors 
- Differentiated approach by 
countries/subregions 
- Concentration of funds in 
less developed countries 
- From demand-driven 
programming to policy-
dialogue based programming 
- Strategy documents with 
multiannual indicative 
appropriation 
 
Preliminary communication 
for the first Summit of Heads 
of State and Government EU-
LAC in Río de Janeiro, June 
1999.  
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‘Follow-up to the first summit between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union’, COM(2000) 670, 31 October 2000 
 
Political objectives 
 
Economic objectives 
 
Social objectives 
Interdependence 
management objectives  
Cross-cutting strategies and 
elements 
 
Other aspects 
- Promotion and protection of 
human rights: intensification 
of support for human rights 
organisations, ombudsmen 
- Support for democratic 
political systems 
- Promotion and protection of 
economic and social rights 
Specific initiative: to create an 
EU-LAC discussion forum on 
human rights 
- To strengthen dialogue and 
cooperation with LA on the 
WTO round 
- Specific measure for 
promoting the ‘Information 
Society’ (ALIS programme) 
- Measures supporting 
subregional integration: 
financial stability for 
Mercosur-Chile; Access to 
‘post-GSP’ markets with 
Andean Community; 
application of the association 
agreement with Mexico; 
regional integration with 
Central America. 
Support for the most 
vulnerable groups and the 
combating of poverty (in 
accordance with COM(2000) 
212 on development policy) 
Specific initiative: ‘Social 
initiative’ for LAC 
 
Disaster prevention through 
subregional strategies with 
Andean Community and 
Central America.  
In relation to the 11 Tuusula 
priorities, a distinction is 
made between the three 
regional priorities (human 
rights, information society and 
the reduction of social 
imbalances). The remainder 
will fall within subregional 
and bilateral strategies and 
dialogues  
- Principles for action. 
Subsidiarity, balance between 
regional, subregional and 
bilateral strategy, and realism 
as regards Commission goals 
and resources 
The communication 
specifically assumes both the 
priorities laid down in 
COM(99) 105 and the 
priorities agreed at the 
Summit and implemented at 
Tuusula, insofar as they affect 
the competences of the 
Commission, which will give 
‘added value, rapid results and 
visibility’ 
 
‘Communication on the Commission's objectives, in the framework of the relations between the European Union and Latin America, in view of the 
3rd Summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean to be held in Guadalajara (Mexico) on 
28 May 2004, COM(2004) 220, 7 April 2004 
To promote democratic 
governance. 
- To strengthen the WTO and 
multilateralism.  
- To promote integration. 
‘Integration deficit’ slows 
growth and hinders EU-LAC 
relations 
- To promote association 
agreements with CA and the 
Andean Community when the 
Doha round is completed and 
there is ‘sufficient’ 
integration, agreed in an 
effective institutional 
framework – the customs 
union – and removal of non-
tariff barriers.  
To promote EU-LAC 
cooperation on social 
cohesion by fighting poverty 
and inequality, and 
strengthening public finances 
for social policy to play a 
redistributive role.  
 Integration objectives: 
developed at subregional 
level. 
Preparatory document for the 
Guadalajara Summit, in which 
the Commission makes 
concrete proposals for EU and 
LAC Heads of State and 
Government to adopt 
decisions 
- Includes an ‘assessment 
report’ (SN 2346/4/02/REV 4, 
17 May 2002) that reaffirms 
the validity of the 55 Río 
priorities and the 11 Tuusula 
priorities.  
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‘A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America’, COM (2005) 636 final, 8 December 2005 
 
Political objectives 
 
Economic objectives 
 
Social objectives 
Interdependence 
management objectives  
Cross-cutting strategies and 
elements 
 
Other aspects 
-  To step up and focus 
political dialogue, with 
better targeting of subject 
areas; greater flexibility 
(ministerial meetings in 
troika format, senior 
officials in thematic 
meetings, etc) 
 
-  To strengthen democratic 
governance through 
cooperation operations that 
will strengthen governance 
and encourage inclusion, of 
poorer citizens in particular. 
 
- To create a Euro-Latin 
American parliamentary 
assembly. 
 
To play a more active role in 
conflict prevention and crisis 
management in Latin America 
by: 
-  Transfers of experience in 
this area; 
-  Support for the efforts of 
countries and regional 
bodies; 
-  Dialogue and structured 
cooperation with the OAS 
and Rio Group  
-  Use of the Instrument for 
Stability. 
- To create a climate 
favourable to trade and 
investment. 
- To support the WTO, but 
efforts will be made at the 
same time to develop the 
network of association 
agreements with LA 
- Dialogue facilitating access 
to markets, dialogue on 
barriers to trade and 
investment, dialogue on 
macroeconomic stability 
- Greater role for European 
cutting-edge technology 
sectors in developing the 
region through an R&D 
framework programme. 
- To promote a climate 
favourable to European 
businesses in Latin America 
by stepping up dialogue for 
the adoption of common rules 
and standards. 
- To encourage greater 
regional integration through 
transport and energy 
infrastructure, sharing its 
experience of network 
infrastructures and 
encouraging the EIB to lend 
its support as part of the future 
‘Latin American facility’ 
 
Since the Guadalajara 
Summit, social cohesion has 
been a shared goal and 
priority area of EU-LA 
relations.  
 
The EU will therefore 
integrate the aim of social 
cohesion into all action 
undertaken with Latin 
America. This involves: 
- setting up a specific 
dialogue; 
- prioritising social cohesion 
in development cooperation; 
- strengthening cooperation 
with international institutions; 
- promoting the participation 
of the actors involved 
(organisation every two years 
of a ‘forum for social 
cohesion’) 
 
 
To strengthen security, 
particularly in the fight 
against drugs, on a basis of 
shared responsibility 
 
Greater environmental co-
operation, with:  
- dialogue on the 
environmental aspects of 
sustainable development; 
- meeting between 
environment ministers in 
preparation for the Summits; 
- more in-depth discussions in 
international bodies, 
particularly on climate 
change. 
 
 
More selective, concentrated 
and coordinated cooperation. 
Through the programming 
document (RSP) 2007-2013 
the Commission proposes: 
- To focus on priority areas 
(social cohesion and regional 
integration); 
- To target the greater part of 
poverty reduction funds on 
low-income and lower 
middle-income countries; 
- To carry out targeted actions 
of mutual interest with upper 
middle-income countries 
- To provide support for 
subregional integration with 
Mercosur, the Andean 
Community and Central 
America; 
 
- To increase the coordination 
of European aid in general and 
the visibility of cooperation in 
particular. 
 
Building a common area of 
higher education between the 
two regions. The aim is to 
ensure that more than 4 000 
Latin American teachers and 
students are invited to visit 
European universities in the 
period 2007-2013. 
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EU regional cooperation strategies with Latin America. Summary table 
 
‘Latin America regional strategy document. 2002-2006 Programming’, AIDCO/0021/2002, April 2002 
 
Political objectives 
 
Economic objectives 
 
Social objectives 
Interdependence 
management objectives  
Cross-cutting strategies and 
elements 
 
Other aspects 
General objective: to support 
the bi-regional strategic 
partnership. To respond to 
regional challenges at an 
economic, technological, 
social and environmental level 
 - To strengthen cooperation 
between civil society 
networks (AL-Invest, URB-
AL, ALFA, ALIS, etc.), with 
60%-70% of the indicative 
financial allocation. 
- Social initiative, with 15%-
20% of the indicative 
financial allocation. 
 
- Priority sector: natural 
disaster prevention and rapid 
implementation of 
reconstruction measures, with 
20% of the indicative 
financial allocation. 
- Network of administrations 
responsible for sustainable 
management of energy 
(EUR 10-20 million) 
- Consistency between the 
regional, subregional and 
bilateral dimensions. 
- Concentration on four 
priority fields: support for 
relations between civil society 
networks through 
decentralised cooperation; 
social initiative; prevention of 
natural disasters; and 
‘accompanying measures’: 
EULARO (EUR 1.5 million)  
- Consistency with 
Community policies (trade, 
fisheries, drugs, environment, 
etc.)  
- Synergy with other donors 
- Visibility of regional 
cooperation 
Regional programming 
document (RSP), in the 
‘COM’. Prepared with a view 
to the II EU-LAC Summit 
(Madrid, May 2002) 
- Defines the indicative 
multiannual budget 2002-
2006: EUR 1 725 million, and 
280 for regional actions 
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Latin America. Regional Programming Document 2007-2013, (E/2007/1417) July 2007 
First area:  
Social cohesion by reducing poverty, 
inequality and exclusion  
Second area:  
Regional integration 
Third area: 
Investment in human resources and 
support for mutual understanding 
 
Other aspects 
Objectives:  
- To stimulate dialogue between countries 
and subregions on cohesion  
- To exchange experience and good practice 
- To make greater use of Eurosocial 
- To promote dialogue with the IADB, 
ECLAC, UNDP and other stakeholders 
 
Instruments: 
- Eurosocial (Eurosocial II, under study) 
- Further measures to promote civil society 
participation 
- Working party with IADB, ECLAC, IMF 
and EC. Biennial report on social cohesion 
 
Resources: 35%, EUR 194 million 
 
Measures in first 2007-2010 RIP 
Adjustment of Eurosocial and URB-AL 
 
 
Other measures: cooperation in the fight 
against illegal drugs 
- Training and institution building 
- Intelligence-sharing and data-protection 
infrastructure 
 
Objectives: 
- To promote the activities of network 
operators and regions 
- To promote dialogue and institutional 
capacity building on links between 
integration, investment and development 
- Interconnectivity of transport networks 
under new EIB mandate 
 
Instruments:  
- EIB loans 
- Studies and conferences 
 
Resources: 25%, EUR 139 million 
 
 
Measures: not defined 
Objectives: 
- To strengthen the region's competitiveness 
- To improve mutual understanding between 
the two regions 
 
Instruments:  
New ‘special programme’ to improve higher 
education in the region through Erasmus-
Mundus scholarships (external cooperation), 
and strengthen links between academic 
institutions through teacher mobility and 
links with businesses, support for network 
connectivity 
 
Resources: 40%, EUR 223 million 
 
Measures: 
- 4 000 scholarships (defined by the Vienna 
Declaration) 
- ‘Mutual understanding’ specific 
programme (to be defined) 
 
Linkage between political priorities and 
regional cooperation will be ensured 
 
Improvements in effectiveness: 
 
-  Improving visibility 
- Search for complementarity and synergies 
-  Tailor-made instruments 
-  Partnerships with regional stakeholders 
- Recognition of disparities in stakeholder 
capabilities 
-  Incorporating cross-cutting issues 
(gender, human rights, indigenous 
peoples, environment and culture). 
- Centralised management 
 
Total budget: 
EUR 556 million (21% of resources 
allocated to LA by DCI) 
 
RIP: Regional Indicative Programme 
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Latin American participation in the Sixth EU Research Framework Programme 
 
Country No of applicant 
institutions 
% success of proposals 
Argentina 544 15.81 
Bolivia 107 13.08 
Brazil 843 17.56 
Chile 393 17.30 
Colombia 177 9.60 
Costa Rica 77 15.58 
Ecuador 92 14.13 
El Salvador 18 33.33 
Guatemala 32 9.38 
Honduras 14 14.29 
Mexico 270 20.00 
Nicaragua 34 17.65 
Panama 12 8.33 
Paraguay 31 25.81 
Peru 179 13.97 
Uruguay 96 23.96 
Venezuela 92 11.96 
 
Source: DG Research, INCO programme 
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